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First	Perspectives	on	the	Zero	Draft	(5	February	2018)	for	the	UN	Global	Compact	
on	Safe,	Orderly	and	Regular	Migration		
	
Professor	Elspeth	Guild,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	and	Dr	Tugba	Basaran,	
Centre	d	Etudes	sur	les	conflits,	la	liberte	et	la	securite,	Paris;	visiting	scholar	
Harvard	University,	Editors	
	In	this	contribution	to	the	negotiations	of	a	UN	Global	Compact	Migration	a	number	of	academics	and	practitioners	based	at	different	institutions	and	different	countries	have	come	 together	 to	 provide	 their	 initial	 views	 and	 comments	 on	 the	 first	 draft.	 The	objective	 of	 this	 document	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 initial	 response	 to	 the	 Zero	 Draft	 from	academia	and	civil	society	which	examine	what	we	consider	to	be	the	key	parts	of	 the	Zero	Draft.	For	each	section	examined	we	provide	our	personal	views	on	the	advantages	and	weaknesses	inherent	in	the	approach	and	some	commentary	explaining	briefly	the	reasons	 for	 our	 positions.	 This	 paper	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 detailed	 examination	 of	every	aspect	of	the	Zero	Draft	and	should	be	read	together	with	the	Draft.1		The	emphasis	in	the	preamble	of	the	Zero	Draft	on	existing	human	rights	standards	and	their	 applicability	 to	 migrants	 is	 very	 important.	 Indeed,	 more	 concentration	 on	 the	existing	UN	human	rights	standards,	starting	of	course	with	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	and	all	the	conventions	which	provide	specificity	to	it	must	be	at	the	 centre	 of	 the	 Compact.	 The	 Global	 Compact	 must	 be	 guided	 by	 the	 New	 York	Declaration	 that	was	 agreed	 by	 consensus	 of	Member	 States	 at	 the	 General	 Assembly	meeting	 in	September	2016.	Negotiations	on	 the	Compact	 itself	 cannot	permit	a	 small	number	 of	 States	 to	 alter	 the	 content	 of	 what	 was	 originally	 agreed.	 The	 New	 York	Declaration	must	provide	a	framework	for	the	Compact,	especially	in	regard	to	Human	Rights.	 It	 would	 be	 unacceptable	 if	 the	 final	 version	 of	 the	 Compact	 gave	 even	 the	appearance	of	moving	away	from	the	existing	obligations	of	states	to	protect	and	deliver	human	 rights	 for	 migrants	 (as	 well	 as	 citizens).	 Fuller	 references	 to	 the	 core	international	 human	 rights	 treaties	 would	 be	 welcome	 here	 rather	 than	 a	 selective	approach	taken	in	preamble	1.			The	 vision	 and	 guiding	 principles	 of	 the	 Zero	 Draft	 include	 three	 sections	 –	 common	understanding,	shared	responsibilities	and	unity	of	purpose.	All	three	reflect	a	common	approach	 –	 states	 must	 work	 together	 on	 issues	 around	 migration	 as	 migration	 is	normal,	 advantageous	 for	 countries	 and	 part	 of	 international	 prosperity.	 It	 is	 also	important	 that	 state	 authorities	 remember	 that	 the	 only	 thing	 which	 divides	 their	citizens	from	being	migrants	(or	foreigners)	is	the	international	border.	Everyone	can	be	a	migrant	by	reason	of	crossing	an	international	border	and	residing	outside	his	or	her	country	 of	 nationality.	 How	 this	 person,	 citizen	 of	 one	 country	 and	 subject	 to	 the	immigration	rules	of	another	is	treated	is	a	matter	of	 international	relations.	It	 is	right	that	 the	 UN	 is	 seeking	 new	ways	 to	 diminish	 friction	which	 arises	 from	 time	 to	 time	regarding	migrants	and	to	ensure	that	states	deliver	their	human	rights	duties	including	to	 migrants	 who	 are	 equally	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 human	 rights	 conventions.	 The	centrality	of	those	human	rights	obligations	needs	to	be	highlighted	in	the	Compact.	
																																								 																				1	Accessible	online	here:	http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180205_gcm_zero_draft_final.pdf.	
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	Given	the	new	focus	on	information	gathering,	sharing	and	knowledge	building,	which	is	evident	 throughout	 the	 preamble	 and	 draft	 objectives,	 the	 Compact	must	 address	 the	data	protection	rights	of	migrants	themselves.	The	necessity	of	firewalls	to	ensure	that	data	regarding	migrants	is	not	being	shared	across	States	without	permission,	is	absent	from	the	current	draft	but	is	essential	to	protect	their	privacy.			In	 the	 following	sections,	expert	academics	and	members	of	civil	 society	provide	 their	perspectives	on	the	positive	and	negative	elements	of	key	objectives	set	out	in	the	Zero	Draft.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 there	 is	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 implementation	 and	 follow	 up	proposed	in	the	Zero	Draft.	
	
OBJECTIVE	1:	collect	and	utilize	accurate	and	disaggregated	data	as	a	basis	for	
evidence	based	policies		Professor	Elspeth	Guild,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London		Positive	 Elements:	 evidence	 based	 policy	 making.	 This	 is	 a	 very	 important	 aspect	 of	national	policy	on	migration	and	mobility.	Too	often	policy	appears	to	be	developed	on	the	basis	of	 lack	of	 information	and	personal	 impressions	verging	on	prejudices.	Using	real	 data	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 policy	 development	 is	 key	 to	 good	 public	 policy.	 Hereby	 the	Global	 Compact	 should	 place	 individuals	 at	 its	 core	 (as	 per	 Zero	 Draft,	 para	 13).	Gathering	data	on	the	costs	of	migration	and	reducing	the	costs	of	migration	should	be	a	core	 objective	 in	 the	 collection	 of	 data	 as	 a	 basis	 of	 evidence	 based	 policies.	 As	 the	international	 community	 has	 underlined,	 migration	 is	 excessively	 priced	 for	 the	majority	 (A/68/190,	 25	 July	 2013).	What	 these	 costs	 entail,	 how	 they	 are	 distributed	and	who	encounters	them	where	has	so	far	been	insufficiently	analyzed,	due	to	lack	of	sufficient	data.	This	data	needs	 to	 take	 into	 account	a)	up-front	 costs	 for	 recruitment,	but	also	b)	wage,	working	and	social	condition	differentials	in	the	destination	countries,	and	 c)	 return	 costs	 (see	 the	 Migrant	 Premium	 2018).	 The	 reduction	 of	 the	 migrant	premium	 and	 associated	 costs	 may,	 under	 certain	 conditions	 (such	 as	 prohibited	discrimination),	not	be	only	a	desirable	outcome,	but	an	international	obligation.		Some	of	 these	 objectives	 are	 in	 the	Zero	Draft	 under	1h)	 such	 as	 ‘remittance	 transfer	 costs,	health,	 education,	 living	 and	 working	 conditions,	 wages’,	 but	 a	 more	 extensive	 data	collection	 is	 required	 that	 covers	 the	 full	 cycle	 of	 cost	 for	 the	 variety	 of	 migration	corridors.				Negative	 Elements:	 disaggregated	 data	 sharing	 among	 states:	 all	 people	whether	 they	are	mobile	or	sedentary	are	entitled	to	the	right	to	privacy	expressed	in	the	UDHR	and	Article	 17	 ICCPR.	 The	 volition	 to	 capture	 data	 of	 passengers	 is	 evident	 in	 various	Passenger	Name	Record	agreements,	the	Trump	Travel	Bans	which	are	justified	on	the	obligation	 of	 all	 states	 to	 provide	 the	 US	 authorities	 with	 information	 about	 people	leaving	 their	 countries	 for	 the	 USA.	 In	 many	 states	 concern	 about	 the	 entitlement	 of	state	 authorities	 to	 cull	 and	 manipulate	 data	 of	 citizens	 is	 subject	 to	 constitutional	limitations.	But	as	soon	as	the	citizen	is	mobile	moving	across	international	borders,	his	or	her	data	is	treated	in	the	same	way	as	that	of	a	foreigner	(see	passenger	name	record	agreements).	That	some	states	use	mobility	as	a	surrogate	to	enable	them	to	collect	data	on	 their	 own	 citizens	who	 have	 travelled	 abroad	 indicates	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 problem.	National	constitutional	protections	of	citizens	from	the	snooping	state	are	not	sufficient.	This	 protection	 of	 privacy	 extends	 internationally	 through	 Article	 17	 ICCPR	 –	 the	
snooping	 state	 is	 equally	 prohibited	 from	 trying	 to	 cull	 our	 personal	 information	whether	we	are	citizens	or	foreigners.		
	
	Commentary	There	is	a	tendency	in	many	states	to	seek	ever	increasing	amounts	of	personal	data	on	both	 their	 own	 citizens	 (often	 blocked	 by	 national	 constitutions)	 and	 foreigners.	 The	convergence	of	fears	about	foreigners	and	risks	to	society	has	resulted	in	a	legitimation	of	the	collection	of	as	much	data	as	possible	about	people,	both	through	obligations	on	the	private	sector	(such	as	Facebook,	Microsoft	etc)	to	provide	data	which	people	have	provided	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 access	 to	 specific	 services	 and	 through	 public	 means.	Mobility	 is	 one	of	 those	areas	where	 some	 states	 claim	 there	 is	 a	 grey	 space	between	being	a	passenger	and	being	a	citizen	or	foreigner	entering	a	state.	In	that	grey	area	the	collection,	storage,	manipulation	and	sharing	of	personal	data	becomes	a	contested	area.			It	would	be	a	worrying	development	if	the	Global	Compact	on	Safe,	Orderly	and	Regular	Migration	 adopted	 an	 approach	 that	 the	 privacy	 of	 people,	 whether	 foreigners	 or	citizens,	can	be	collected,	stored	manipulated	and	shared	irrespective	of	the	human	right	to	privacy.	This	profound	challenge	to	the	right	to	privacy	a	right	espoused	in	the	UDHR	and	 given	 constraining	 force	 in	 Article	 17	 ICCPR	 must	 be	 justified.	 The	 objective	 of	orderly	movement	must	not	be	linked	to	the	collection	of	personal	data.	Rather	it	should	be	associated	with	safe	travel	which	brings	people	to	places	where	the	authorities	of	the	destination	 expect	 them	 to	 arrive.	 People	 only	 arrive	 in	 disorderly	 manners	 because	they	cannot	arrive	orderly	(a	result	of	obstacles	to	ordinary	movement	in	the	forms	of	visas,	carriers	sanctions	and	others).	Orderly	arrival	requires	states	to	encourage	people	to	 arrive	 in	 places	 where	 they	 have	 plenty	 of	 border	 guards	 in	 place	 rather	 than	diverting	some	people	to	risky	and	uncommon	entry	points	where	there	are	no	border	guards.	It	is	not	wise	in	a	Global	Compact	to	encourage	states	to	have	disregard	to	their	obligations	to	protect	the	right	to	privacy	of	all	people,	whether	citizens	or	foreigners.		
Objective	3:	Provide	adequate	and	timely	information	at	all	stages	of	migration.	Katharine	T.	Weatherhead,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	
	Positive	 Elements:	 This	 objective	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	 developing	 predictability	 in	migration	policies	and	supporting	people	to	understand	the	 frameworks	which	 impact	upon	 their	 migration.	 The	 objective	 recognises	 that	 information	 can	 help	 to	 enable	access	 to	 justice	 and	 basic	 services	 which	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 migrants’	human	rights.			Negative	 Elements:	 The	 language	 in	 this	 objective	 privileges	 a	 State-centred	understanding	 of	 information	 dissemination.	 Such	 an	 understanding	 limits	 the	opportunities	 for	 migrants	 to	 make	 use	 of	 information	 about	 laws	 and	 policies,	 and	widens	the	risks	for	information	to	be	dominated	by	migration	restriction	efforts.				
Commentary		This	 objective	 goes	 beyond	 the	 New	 York	 Declaration	 in	 considering	 the	 place	 of	information	in	migration	and	prompts	activity	which	can	help	people	to	understand	the	procedures,	rights,	and	obligations	engaged	during	migration.	It	expansively	commits	to	information	efforts	which	take	into	account	all	stages	of	migration,	including	emergency	
situations	where	information	should	be	provided	to	migrants	‘on	an	equal	footing	with	nationals’.	 The	 objective	 includes	 actions	 which	 provide	 for	 information	 to	 be	 made	available	 about	 fundamental	 human	 rights,	 international	 protection,	 access	 to	 basic	services,	 and	 access	 to	 justice,	 particularly	 around	 human	 rights	 violations.	 These	features	indicate	potential	for	the	objective	to	contribute	to	migration	policies	which	are	accessible	 from	 an	 information	 perspective	 and	 whose	 human	 rights	 protections	 are	open	to	being	called	upon.		However,	 there	 is	 room	 for	 this	 potential	 to	 be	 enhanced	 in	 later	 drafts	 of	 the	Global	Compact	 on	 Migration.	 	 The	 actions	 are	 centred	 around	 State	 measures	 to	 provide	migrants	 with	 information	 about	 laws	 and	 policies,	 without	 recognition	 of	 people’s	rights	also	to	seek,	receive,	and	impart	information,	in	the	language	of	Article	19	UDHR.	Action	which	 supports	migrant	 efforts	 to	 seek,	 receive,	 and	 impart	 information	might	include,	 for	 example,	 responding	 to	 communication	 needs	 that	 arise	 from	 language	differences,	 literacy	 levels,	 connectivity	 issues,	 and	 gender.	 It	 might	 also	 include	strengthening	the	opportunities	for	people	to	know	about	their	own	personal	migration	situation,	rather	than	only	general	laws	and	policies.			As	 it	 stands,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 objective	 may	 encourage	 States	 to	 emphasise	deterrence	 in	 their	 information	 activities,	 rather	 than	 commit	 to	 developing	predictability	 and	 certainty	 as	 stated.	 The	 risk	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 combination	 of	references	 to	 informing	 migrant	 decisions,	 pre-departure	 orientation,	 dangers	 of	irregular	migration,	data	gathering	and	intelligence	sharing	between	States,	as	well	as	a	lack	of	 reference	 to	 independent	or	 trusted	 information	sources.	Some	people	migrate	out	 of	 desperation,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 Secretary	 General’s	 report,	 and	 information	plays	 a	 complex	 role	 in	 these	 cases.	 Objective	 3	 would	 benefit	 from	 understanding	information	 dissemination	 more	 broadly	 as	 an	 ongoing	 and	 non-linear	 conversation	between	migration	stakeholders.		
OBJECTIVE	 4:	 Provide	 all	 migrants	 with	 proof	 of	 legal	 identity,	 proper	
identification	and	documentation	Amal	de	Chickera,	Institute	on	Statelessness	and	Inclusion		Positive	Elements:	Firstly,	it	is	a	big	positive	to	see	such	a	clear	commitment	in	the	Zero	Draft	 to	addressing	statelessness	 in	the	context	of	migration.	Statelessness	 is	an	often-overlooked	 issue,	whereas	 para	 18	 of	 the	 Zero	Draft	 sets	 out	 a	 commitment	 from	 the	outset	to	“equip	migrants	with	proof	of	legal	identity	…	at	all	stages	of	migration	in	order	
to	 end	 statelessness	 and	 avoid	 other	 vulnerabilities.”	 A	 second	 positive	 is	 that	 this	objective	 speaks	 of	 “proof	 of	 legal	 identity”,	 and	 not	 ‘legal	 identity’	 per	 se.	 This	 is	 a	significant	 improvement	 on	 the	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals,	 Target	 16.9	 which	speaks	of	“Legal	identity	for	all…”	The	phrasing	of	the	Zero	Draft	is	an	acknowledgement	that	every	person’s	 identity	 is	 inherent	 to	 them,	and	 that	 the	 lack	of	documentation	 is	not	 to	be	equated	with	a	 lack	of	 legal	 identity.	Given	 that	 inter	alia	 ‘nationality’	 is	one	component	of	a	person’s	legal	identity	(CRC	Article	8.1),	this	is	an	important	distinction	to	be	made.		Other	positives	 include	 the	 emphasis	 on	providing	 identity	 documents	 to	 all	migrants	
“by	 registering	 migrant	 births	 and	 reaching	 undocumented	 populations”.	 This	commitment	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 existing	 state	 obligations	 to	 avoid	 statelessness	 and	
ensure	the	right	to	a	nationality;	and	it	points	to	a	real	world	problem,	where	in	many	countries,	 stateless	 persons	 and	 irregular	 migrants	 are	 wrongly	 denied	 birth	registration.			The	 commitment	 to	 ensuring	 “adequate,	 timely,	 reliable	 and	 accessible	 consular	
documentation	 to	 all	 migrants”,	 is	 also	 important,	 given	 that	 many	 migrants	 become	stateless	when	their	own	country	fails	to	recognise	and	protect	them.	This	commitment	therefore,	addresses	one	of	the	most	common	challenges	in	the	context	of	statelessness	and	 migration,	 where	 an	 individual	 is	 caught	 between	 a	 failure/refusal	 to	 take	responsibility	of	the	country	of	origin,	and	a	failure/refusal	to	identify	and	protect,	of	the	country	of	migration.	As	will	be	addressed	later,	the	Zero	Draft	could	have	taken	a	more	comprehensive	position	here,	but	nonetheless,	this	is	a	positive	element	of	the	text.		Another	 positive	 is	 the	 commitment	 to	 “Abolish	 requirements	 to	 prove	 citizenship	 or	
nationality	at	service	delivery	centres	to	ensure	that	stateless	migrants	are	not	precluded	
from	accessing	basic	services	nor	denied	other	basic	human	rights”.	In	practice,	stateless	people	are	routinely	denied	access	to	basic	services	and	rights	because	of	their	lack	of	a	nationality,	whereas	human	rights	law	is	clear	that	this	should	not	be	the	case.	And	so,	this	is	a	timely	and	important	restatement	of	a	commitment	to	respect	and	protect	the	universal	application	of	human	rights	 to	all	persons.	The	related	commitment	 to	 issue	identity	cards	to	all	migrants	(regardless	of	their	status),	is	a	practical	recommendation,	which	 could	 increase	 the	 likelihood	of	 stateless	migrants	 actually	being	able	 to	 access	their	 rights.	 However,	 here	 too,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 below,	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 in	implementation,	 and	 a	 missed	 opportunity	 for	 more	 comprehensive	 and	 sustainable	protection.		Negative	Elements:	The	over-reliance	on	biometrics,	without	placing	equal	emphasis	on	privacy,	data	protection	and	 the	prevention	of	 abuses,	 is	perhaps	 the	biggest	 concern.	Para	18.a.	and	18.c.	both	call	 for	the	rolling	out	and	sharing	of	biometric	data,	with	no	reference	to	guarding	against	potential	abuses.	Furthermore,	Para	18.g.	speaks	of	issuing	all	 migrants	 with	 identity	 cards,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 enabling	 their	 access	 to	 services	 and	rights.	 In	 reality,	 the	 rolling	 out	 and	 sharing	 of	 biometric	 data	 and	 the	 linking	 of	 the	possession	of	biometric	cards	to	accessing	socio-economic	rights,	has	led	to	many	large-scale	 lapses	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 right	 to	 privacy,	 as	 well	 as	 abuses	 of	 power	 by	 public	officials.	 The	 experience	 in	 India	with	 the	 rolling	 out	 of	Aadhar	 cards	 is	 one	 example.	Furthermore,	 there	 is	 a	 concern	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 connecting	 up	 para	 18.g.	 to	Objective	 12	 on	 status	 determination,	 the	 process	 of	 providing	 stateless	 persons	with	identity	cards	could	serve	as	a	precursor	to	attempted	removal,	as	opposed	to	protection	and	integration.	Importantly,	the	emphasis	on	biometric	data	runs	throughout	the	Zero	Draft	and	should	therefore	be	addressed	at	a	more	fundamental	level.		The	other	concerns	related	to	the	Objective	4	text,	are	less	about	negative	elements,	and	more	about	missed	opportunities.	These	are	looked	at	in	the	commentary	below.				
Commentary		
	Objective	4	goes	beyond	the	New	York	Declaration,	by	clearly	identifying	statelessness	as	a	phenomenon	that	can	and	must	be	addressed	through	the	Global	Compact,	and	by	providing	some	concrete	and	practical	guidance	on	how	this	can	be	done.	Many	of	 the	
positive	elements	of	the	text	have	been	discussed	above,	as	has	the	negative	element	of	emphasis	on	 ‘biometric	data’	with	no	adequate	attention	 to	protection	 from	abuses	 in	this	regard.			Upon	analysis,	the	most	important	take	away	from	the	Objective	4	text	is	that	it	goes	far,	but	not	far	enough.	It	identifies	how	statelessness	can	be	caused	in	a	migration	context,	but	only	offers	partial	solutions.	It	provides	sound,	practical	guidance	on	how	stateless	people	can	be	protected	in	a	migration	context	but	does	not	extend	this	to	all	stateless	people.	Where	the	text	would	have	benefited	from	direct	reference	to	other	Objectives	(and	 where	 other	 Objectives	 should	 refer	 to	 Objective	 4),	 it	 fails	 to	 do	 so.	 And	 so,	Objective	4	is	both	a	marker	of	progress	and	of	missed	opportunity.			The	text	appears	to	build	on	dual	assumptions	that:	1. Providing	 migrants	 with	 the	 right	 documentation	 alone	 will	 resolve	 their	statelessness.		2. The	 overwhelming	 responsibility	 to	 end	 statelessness	 lies	 with	 the	 country	 of	origin.		As	 such,	 it	 is	 largely	 silent	 on	 the	more	 fundamental	 problem	 of	 discriminatory	 laws,	policies	 and	 practices	 which	 create	 and	 perpetuate	 statelessness	 (regardless	 of	documentation);	and	does	not	re-state	the	human	rights	obligation	of	host	states	to	also	play	a	role	in	ending	statelessness.			Para	 18.b.	 for	 example,	 calls	 for	 strengthened	 measures	 to	 “facilitate	 citizenship	 to	
children	born	 in	another	State’s	 territory	 in	 situations	where	a	child	would	otherwise	be	
stateless,	including	by	allowing	women	to	confer	their	nationality	to	their	children”.	While	this	paragraph	sets	out	obligations	of	the	country	of	origin	of	the	parents	of	a	child	born	in	a	third	country,	it	is	silent	on	the	obligation	of	country	of	birth	/	migration,	to	grant	nationality	to	children	born	on	their	territory	who	would	otherwise	be	stateless,	which	is	 clearly	 set	 out	 in	 both	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 and	 the	 1961	Convention	on	 the	Reduction	of	 Statelessness.	 Furthermore,	while	 it	 is	 important	 that	discrimination	 against	 women	 has	 been	 set	 out,	 an	 opportunity	 to	 be	 more	comprehensive	 has	 been	 missed,	 both	 through	 the	 failure	 to	 emphasise	 that	 fathers	should	also	have	the	right	to	pass	on	nationality	to	children	born	abroad,	and	to	cover	other	forms	of	discrimination	(race,	disability	etc.)	which	also	cause	statelessness.		
	Para	18.d.	on	access	to	consular	documentation,	is	also	largely	positive.	However,	while	it	sets	out	the	role	of	the	country	of	origin	to	provide	consular	documentation,	it	is	silent	on	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 host	 state	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 protection	 and	documentation.	 Furthermore,	 the	 text	 does	 not	 cross-refer	 this	 commitment	 with	Objectives	 12	 (status	 determination),	 13	 (detention)	 and	 14	 (consular	 protection).	Significantly,	 the	 text	of	 all	 of	 these	Objectives	do	not	 refer	 to	 statelessness,	despite	 it	being	of	utmost	relevance.	Had	the	text	approached	this	issue	in	a	more	comprehensive	way,	 it	 would	 have	 made	 a	 connection	 between	 (lack	 of)	 consular	 protection	 and	documentation	and	(prohibition	of)	arbitrary	detention,	 concluding	 that	 the	host	state	has	an	obligation	to	protect	those	who	have	no	consular	protection	or	are	denied	it	by	their	state.	This	should	then	lead	to	referral	to	a	Statelessness	Determination	Procedure	(which	should	be	directly	addressed	under	Objective	12).	
	
Similarly,	para	18.f.	on	abolishing	requirements	to	prove	citizenship	 in	order	to	access	rights	 and	 services	 could	 have	 gone	 further,	 by	 recommending	 that	 such	 persons	 are	automatically	 referred	 to	 a	 Statelessness	Determination	Procedure.		 It	 is	 only	 through	being	identified	as	stateless	in	a	migration	context,	that	durable	solutions	will	ultimately	be	viable.				
Objective	5:	Enhance	availability	and	flexibility	of	pathways	for	regular	migration	Kees	Groenendijk,	Emeritus	Professor	of	Sociology	of	Law	at	the	University	of	Nijmegen	Positive	elements:	"allowing	flexible	visa	status	conversions"	under	(d)	and	facilitating	regional	free	movement	regimes	and	visa	liberalisation	under	(b).	A	number	of	regions	in	the	world	have	implemented	such	regimes	such	as	the	European	Union,	MERCOSUR,	ECOWAS	and	others.	This	practice	reduces	friction	at	borders,	provides	greater	certainty	to	 people	 moving	 across	 these	 regions	 regarding	 their	 states	 and	 clarity	 on	 their	entitlements	which	are	guaranteed	by	the	participating	states	together.		States		and	the	international	community	could	learn	from	the	positive	effects	of	the	practice	of	existing	regional	regimes	on	these	points.	Negative	 elements:	 It	 is	 odd	 that	in	 5(a)	 the	 model	 agreements	 attached	 to	 the	 ILO	Migrant	 Workers	 Conventions	 nos.	 97	 and	 147	 are	 not	 mentioned	 and	 the	 "sector	specific	 standard	 terms	 should	 be	 developed"	 without	 mentioning	 the	 work	 of	 ILO.	Further,	 it	should	be	stated	in	5(e)	that	"accelerated	and	facilitated	visa	processing	for	employers	 with	 a	 track	 record	 of	 compliance"	 should	 be	 open	 not	 only	for	 large	(international)	companies	but	also	accessible	for	medium	and	small	firms.	Clause	5(f)	on	temporary	 and	permanent	protection	does	not	 belong	here	but	 in	 the	 other	Compact.	Clause	 5(g)	 on	 family	 reunification	 sounds	 good	 but	 is	meagre,	since	 it	only	mentions	removing	barriers	to	the	realisation	of	the	right	to	family	life	and	family	unity	(thus	the	absolute	minimum),	 not	 about	 removing	 barriers	 to	 family	 reunification.	Moreover,	 it	should	 be	 added	 that	work	 authorisation	 and	 access	 to	 social	 services/security	 is	 for	admitted	family	members.	Such	wording	would	better	reflect	the	human	right	to	family	life	contained	in	Articles	17	and	22	ICCPR.Commentary	Pathways	 to	 legal	migration	 are	 a	 key	 objective	 for	 the	Compact.	 States	 have	 the	 first	responsibility	for	their	immigration	laws	but	not	an	exclusive	monopoly.	The	right	to	on-refoulement	 is	 the	 most	 well	 recognised	 of	 examples	 where	 any	 state’s	 claim	 to	 an	exclusive	 right	 to	 admit	 or	 not	 admit	 foreigners	 is	 confounded.	 It	 is	 not	 only	 border	control	 but	 also	 migration	 which	 is	 a	 shared	 responsibility	 of	 the	 international	community.	This	 is	because	all	states	have	a	stake	in	the	treatment	of	their	citizens	by	other	countries	and	must	take	into	account	the	legitimate	concerns	of	other	states	about	how	 they	 treat	 the	 nationals	 of	 those	 countries.	 Responsibility	 for	 pathways	 not	 only	requires	a	rethinking	of	 interstate	relations	as	central	 to	border	control	and	migration	but	also	the	position	of	the	private	sector.	Companies	play	a	key	role	in	demanding	safe	pathways	 for	 their	 employees	 to	 enter,	 reside,	 enjoy	 family	 reunification	 and	 be	protected	from	expulsion	irrespective	of	their	nationality.	The	private	sector	has	taken	its	concerns	about	moving	its	personnel	safely	and	legally	around	the	world	to	another	international	venue	–	the	World	Trade	Organisation	–	through	the	widening	of	the	rules	of	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services.	 Once	 again,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 private	sector	to	encourage	and	actively	participate	in	the	adoption	of	legally	binding	solutions	to	 new	 pathways	 through	 international	 commitments	 of	 states	 adopted	 cooperatively	
reveals	 the	 fact	 that	 migration	 pathways	 are	 part	 of	 international	 relations	 not	 an	exclusive	monopoly	of	each	state.		Pathways	for	migration	need	to	meet	the	actual	practices	within	all	states.	If	they	do	not	the	 result	 is	 that	people	 fall	 into	 irregularity.	Where	national	 immigration	rules	 fail	 to	respect	the	reality	on	the	ground	and	most	specifically	the	needs	of	employers	and	the	legitimate	demands	of	 family	reunification	the	result	 is	not	 that	migrants	do	not	come	but	 rather	 that	 they	 live	 in	 irregularity	 with	 all	 the	 negative	 consequences	 thereof.	Exploitation	of	migrants	is	often	made	possible	because	of	the	irregular	status	of	those	migrants.	Family	members	whose	reasonable	desire	to	live	with	their	families	in	a	host	state	 but	 whose	 applications	 are	 rejected	 by	 that	 state’s	 authorities	 for	 reasons	unrelated	to	the	genuine	wish	to	 live	together,	such	as	 income	requirements,	 language	tests,	visas	requirements	etc	frequently	become	irregularly	present.	The	negotiation	of	the	 Compact	 needs	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 human	 rights	 of	 migrants	 as	 employers,	employees,	family	members	and	artists	and	investors	and	encourage	states	to	widen	the	pathways	 for	 regular	 migration	 to	 meet	 these	 shared	 concerns	 of	 the	 international	community	and	the	private	sector.	
OBJECTIVE	7:	Address	and	reduce	vulnerabilities	in	migration	Professor	Delphine	Nakache	(University	of	Ottawa)	and	Professor	Idil	Atak	(Ryerson	University)		Positive	Elements:	The	recognition	that	migrants	face	multiple	and	intersecting	forms	of	vulnerability;	the	placement	of	human	rights	at	the	centre	of	states’	action,	in	particular	through	the	commitment	to	adopt	a	child-specific	and	gender-specific	approach	in	their	actions.	 A	 positive	 element	 is	 also	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 there	 are	 “legal	 and	practical	 impediments”	 in	destination	 states	 that	 are	 conducive	 to	 irregular	migration	and	 that	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 policies	 in	 place	 to	 prevent	 such	 situations.	 Finally,	 the	emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 local	 authorities	 in	 assisting	 migrants	 in	 a	 situation	 of	vulnerability	 is	most	welcome.	 So	 is	 the	 call	 for	 states	 to	 establish	 firewalls	 between	immigration	enforcement	and	public	services.			Negative	 elements:	 Although	 it	 is	 a	 positive	 development	 that	 human	 rights	 are	recognized	as	an	essential	part	of	states’	actions,	 there	 is	no	need	for	the	creation	of	a	new,	 binding	 protocol	 to	 address	 the	 protection	 of	 vulnerable	 migrants	 because	 the	relevant	 norms	 already	 exist	 and	 states	 have	 already	 signed/ratified	 the	 relevant	international	 and	 regional	 human	 rights	 instruments.	 What	 is	 needed,	 however,	 is	 a	commitment	by	states	 to	ensure	 the	protection	of	vulnerable	migrants	based	on	 these	existing	instruments	as	well	as	effective	mechanisms	of	accountability	and	oversight.	On	that	note,	 it	 is	disappointing	to	see	that	most	of	the	commitments	are	formulated	with	reference	 to	broad	human	 rights	protections:	 they	do	not	 identify	who	are	vulnerable	migrants,	 what	 are	 their	 specific	 protection	 needs	 and	which	 approach	 to	 be	 used	 to	fulfill	 their	most	pressing	needs.	 In	fact,	under	Objective	7,	only	children	are	identified	explicitly	 as	 a	 vulnerable	 group.	 The	 situation	 of	 many	 other	 groups	 of	 vulnerable	migrants-	 such	 as	 pregnant	 women,	 migrants	 with	 a	 disability,	 mental	 illness	 or	acute/chronic	 illness,	 elderly	 migrants,	 LGBTQ	 migrants	 and	 migrants	 subjected	 to	extreme	violence,	 trafficking,	 torture	etc.-	 is	unacknowledged.	 	As	well,	 the	wording	of	Objective	 7	 omits	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 vulnerability	 in	which	migrants	 find	 themselves	 is	
mostly	 constructed	 by	 states	 through	 policies	 and	 practices,	 such	 as	 border	 controls,	interception	measures,	restrictive	migration	and	asylum	rules.		
A	 word	 of	 caution	 re-	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	 child.	 The	 commitment	 to	 “uphold	 the	principle	 of	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 child	 as	 a	 primary	 consideration”	 in	 situations	concerning	migrant	children	is	a	positive	step	in	the	right	direction.	 Indeed,	Art.	3.1	of	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child,	which	is	the	most	globally	ratified	UN	human	rights	treaty,	clearly	states	the	right	of	children	to	have	their	best	interests	assessed	and	taken	into	account	as	a	primary	consideration	in	all	actions	or	decisions	that	affect	them.	However,	 Art.	 3.1	 has	 also	 been	 interpreted	 as	meaning	 that	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	child	must	always	prevail	over	any	other	considerations.	This	point	should	be	specified	so	as	to	avoid	any	situation	where	the	interest	of	a	child	is	seen	as	an	important	element	to	be	considered,	but	not	as	one	that	should	outweigh	other	considerations.			
Commentary	Vulnerability	is	a	very	complex	term,	which	can	be	understood	in	a	variety	of	ways	and	hence	can	give	rise	to	different	kinds	of	responses.	In	the	context	of	the	Global	Compact,	the	term	“vulnerability”	focuses	on	the	inherent	vulnerability	of	migrants	that	stem	from	such	factors	as	age	and	gender.	This	often	serves	to	portray	migrants	as	helpless	victims.	However,	migrants’	vulnerability	is	also	policy-induced	and	mostly	constructed	by	states	and	 other	 actors.	 The	 non-acknowledgment	 of	 this	 fact	 effectively	 shifts	 the	responsibility	 for	 the	 problems	 faced	 by	 migrants	 away	 from	 states.	 A	 better	understanding	 of	 vulnerability	 is	 thus	 crucial	 in	 focusing	 the	 debate	 on	 states’	 legal	obligations	towards	migrants.	 It	 is	essential	 to	develop	a	 framework	where	the	policy-induced	 or	 constructed	 vulnerability	 of	 migrants	 is	 identified	 and	 acted	 upon.	 This	framework	should	be	built	upon	existing	human	rights	instruments	and	should	account	for	the	many	circumstances	in	which			migrants’	vulnerability	is	created	or	exacerbated	by	states	and	other	actors.			
OBJECTIVE	8:	Save	lives	and	establish	coordinated	international	efforts	on	missing	
migrants	Syd	Bolton	and	Catriona	Jarvis	Co-Conveners,	Last	Rights	Project	
	Positive	 Elements:	 In	 general,	 the	 proposals	 outlined	 in	 subsections	 (d)	 &	 (e)	 are	welcome.	Confidence	in	the	obtaining	and	analysis	of	data	and	in	the	consequential	data-handling,	 storage	 and	 sharing	 procedures	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 efficient	 and	 timely	investigation	and	identification	of	all	missing	and	deceased	persons.	It	is	a	prerequisite	of	 justice	 that	 relatives	 of	 the	 missing	 and	 the	 deceased	 must	 have	 the	 trust	 and	confidence	 to	 engage	 with	 investigations	 and	 that	 personal	 data	 is	 handled	 and	maintained	in	such	a	way	as	to	prevent	its	degradation	and	misuse.		Negative	 Elements:	 Without	 essential	 procedural	 and	 technological	 safeguards	 of	 the	data	 collected,	 there	 is	 a	 serious	 risk	 that	1	–	 families	will	 refuse	 to	engage	with	 such	procedures	and/or	2	–	families	and	their	missing	relatives	may	be	seriously	prejudiced	by	engagement	or	non-engagement	with	them.		Inappropriate	 and	 inadequate	 handling	 and	 sharing	 of	 data	 may	 undermine	 its	evidential	value	and	also	expose	the	missing	and	their	families	to	harm	within	the	host	country	and/or	their	countries	of	origin.	It	may	delay	or	even	defeat	the	identification	of	
a	person	and	cause	unnecessary	and	prolonged	suffering	to	their	families.	It	may	lead	to	
refoulement	 or	 the	 creation	 of	 refugee	 sur	 place	 claims.	 It	 may	 harm	 the	 interests	 of	children	 as	 missing	 or	 family	 members	 of	 missing	 relatives	 and	 prevent	 recovery,	rehabilitation	and	redress.			
Commentary	The	situation	of	the	missing,	the	bereaved	and	the	dead	is	of	growing	concern	globally	and	 although	 some	 of	 those	 concerns	 are	 now	 reflected	 in	 Objective	 (8)	 of	 the	 draft	Compact,	the	many	other	issues	of	concern	we	have	identified	should	necessarily	inform	a	number	of	other	Objectives	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent.	Whilst	for	the	purpose	of	this	note	we	have	confined	our	brief	comments	to	specific	aspects	of	Objective	8,	they	are	not	exhaustive.	 Objectives	 1,	 4,	 7,	 9,	 10,	 11,	 12,	 13,	 14,	 15,	 16,	 17,	 and	 21	 are	 also	 of	importance	to	the	treatment	of	the	bereaved,	missing	and	the	dead	and	should	be	seen	as	inter-related.	Our	comments	should	be	read	in	that	light.			It	 is	 clear	 from	 our	 observations	 in	 the	 Mediterranean	 and	 the	 USA/Mexican	 border	regions,	with	families	and	with	those	assisting	families	of	the	missing	and	the	dead	that	one	of	their	principle	concerns	is	that	the	information	they	supply	will	be	used	against	them	 or	 their	 missing	 relatives	 by	 the	 police,	 border	 officials	 or	 other	 government	departments	and	as	a	result	they	are	often	very	reluctant	to	share	information	and	data	either	at	all,	or	beyond	trusted	individuals.	This	slows	down,	inhibits	and	even	prevents	investigations.	 Whether	 states	 do	 or	 do	 not	 misuse	 data,	 the	 confidence	 of	 families	needed	to	engage	in	tracing	processes	is	undermined	by	their	lack	of	trust	in	how	it	may	be	used.			Whenever	 States	 gather	 DNA,	 ante-mortem	 and	 post-mortem	 data,	 or	 other	 material	evidence,	 such	 collection,	 storage,	 data-interrogation	 and	matching	procedures	 should	only	be	used	for	the	sole	purpose	of	identification	of	that	individual	missing	person.	The	 fully	 informed	 consent	 of	 relevant	 family	 members	 must	 be	 obtained	 in	 writing	setting	out	the	extent	and	purpose	of	the	data	collection	and	use.	Any	proposed	variation	of	use	must	require	step	by	step	additional	written	consents.	Where	it	 is	necessary	for	such	data	to	be	cross-referenced	with	other	data	systems,	that	data	must	be	anonymised	or	encrypted	and	handled	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	not	open	to	misuse,	for	example	for	the	purpose	 of	 taking	 immigration	 enforcement	 actions,	 criminal	 prosecution,	 exclusion	from	civil	registrations,	health,	welfare,	education	or	employment	or	where	shared	with	a	 foreign	state,	used	 to	persecute	or	otherwise	harm,	discriminate	against	or	 interfere	with	relatives	in	the	country	of	origin.					
	Both	public	and	private	owned	data	storage	systems	and	handling	procedures	must	be	designed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 there	 are	 no	 ‘back-door’	 routes	 into	 the	 data,	 nor	 any	overriding	 authorisation	procedures	which	may	 interfere	with	 the	basis	 on	which	 the	data	was	provided	by	the	families.	This	should	be	a	matter	of	explicit	legislation	as	well	as	 system	designs	 for	 anonymisation,	 firewalls,	 encryption	and	authorised	users.	Data	should	 not	 be	 shared	 internationally	 unless	 the	 state	 or	 organisation	with	whom	 the	data	is	intended	to	be	shared	demonstrates	that	it	meets	these	requirements.	Breaches	of	these	measures	should	be	treated	as	a	criminal	offence.			
	These	proposals	are	consistent	with	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	2017	recommendations	 on	 missing	 migrants	 and	 their	 families2,	 the	 2017	 Joint	 General	Comments	of	the	Committee	on	the	Protection	of	the	Rights	of	All	Migrant	Workers	and	Members	of	Their	Families	and	the	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	on	the	general	principles	 regarding	 the	 human	 rights	 of	 children	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	migration3	and	the	2009	International	Standards	on	the	Protection	of	Personal	Data	and	Privacy	(The	Madrid	Resolution)4	with	which	the	Last	Rights	Project	concurs.	
	
OBJECTIVE	9:	Strengthening	the	transnational	response	to	smuggling	of	migrants	Dr	Jean-Pierre	Gauci,	British	Institute	of	International	and	Comparative	Law		Positive	elements:	A	key	strength	under	Objective	9	is	the	implicit	acknowledgement	of	the	risks	 inherent	 in	 the	conflation	of	smuggling	with	 trafficking,	but	at	 the	same	time	the	 highlighting	 of	 the	 need	 to	 address	 situations	 of	 smuggling	 under	 aggravated	circumstances.	This	recognises	the	risks	experienced	by	smuggled	migrants	and	moves	away	from	the	assumption	of	consent.			Negative	elements:	the	objective	fails	to	move	the	needle	forward	in	efforts	to	deal	with	migrant	 smuggling	 and	 instead	 re-affirms	 the	 existing	 obligations	most	 notably	 those	established	 under	 the	 Smuggling	 Protocol.	 This	 includes	 criminalisation	 of	 smuggling,	cooperation	and	the	protection	of	the	rights	of	smuggled	migrants.			As	a	standalone,	Objective	9	does	not	effectively	address	the	real	 issue	behind	migrant	smuggling	 and	 that	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 other	 pathways	 for	 people	 to	 migrate.	 Some	commitments	in	this	regard	are	set	out	throughout	the	Draft	but	it	would	be	important	to	 acknowledge	 that	 smuggling	happens	because	 it	 remains	 the	only	 viable	option	 for	most	 people.	 This	 effectively	 challenges	 the	 notion	 that	 smuggling	 happens	 with	 the	‘consent’	of	the	smuggled	migrant.			
Commentary	The	 emphasis	 on	 collaboration,	 which	 is	 of	 course	 the	 underpinning	 of	 the	 entire	compact	 is	 critically	 important	 and	 anti-smuggling	 efforts	will	 not	 succeed	without	 it.	That	said,	any	focus	on	cooperation	must	acknowledge	the	limitation	of	that	cooperation	especially	when	 such	 cooperation	 risks	 resulting	 in	 human	 rights	 violations	 including	violations	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 non-refoulment	 or	 the	 return	 of	 people	 to	 situations	 of	harm.	 International	 human	 rights	 law	 builds	 inherent	 limitations	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	cooperation.				The	de-criminalisation	of	irregular	border	crossings	is	something	that	has	been	achieved	in	various	countries	although	it	ought	to	be	noted	that	allowing	for	it	to	be	considered	an	administrative	offence	without	sufficient	safeguards	can	still	result	restrictive	measures	including	detention	and	difficulties	in	accessing	procedures.			
																																								 																				2	https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/missing-migrants-and-their-families.pdf	3	CMW/C/GC/3-CRC/C/GC/22*	-	paragraph	17.	-	http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CMW_C_GC_3_CRC_C_GC_22_8363_E.pdf	4	ICDPPCRD	3	(5	November	2009)	-		http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2009_Madrid/2009_M1.pdf	
The	shift	away	from	the	conflation	between	smuggling	and	trafficking	remains	critically	important.	 Over	 the	 years,	 the	 conflation	 has	 been	 used	 to	 give	 counter-smuggling	measures	 (intended	 to	 keep	 people	 from	 crossing	 borders	 generally)	 the	 legitimacy	enjoyed	by	anti-trafficking	efforts.	This	said,	it	must	be	acknowledged	that	there	are,	in	some	 cases,	 overlaps	 between	 the	 two	 crimes	 which	 must	 be	 addressed	 in	 order	 to	ensure	that	individuals	received	the	care	and	protection	they	are	entitled	to.			The	 text	 of	 the	 Zero	Draft	manifests	 a	 change	 in	 the	way	 that	 smuggled	migrants	 are	framed.	They	are	not	anymore	‘objects’	of	smuggling	(as	the	Smuggling	Protocol	frames	them),	but	rather	‘victims	of	aggravated	smuggling’.	This	builds	on	developments	in	the	human	 rights	 field,	which	 have	 recognized	 the	 human	 rights	 risks	 faced	 by	 smuggled	migrants,	including	to	their	right	to	life	and	dignity	but	also	the	risks	of	exploitation	by	smugglers	en	route.	It	also	builds	on	the	requirement	to	consider	the	crime	of	smuggling	to	be	aggravated	 if	and	when	 it	 is	undertaken	 in	circumstances	 that	endanger	 the	 live	and	safety	of	the	smuggled	migrants.		
	
OBJECTIVE	11:	Manage	borders	in	an	integrated,	secure	and	coordinated	manner	Elif	Mendos	Kuşkonmaz,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London		Positive	 elements:	 Understanding	 border	 governance	 as	 collaboration	 amongst	 states,	rather	than	the	execution	of	state	sovereignty	is	a	positive	element	included	in	Objective	11.	 This	will	 transform	borders	 as	 development	 rather	 than	 a	 barrier,	 and	 encourage	better	relations	between	neighbouring	states.	Also,	placing	the	respect	of	human	rights	of	all	migrants	as	an	aspect	of	border	management	is	a	good	motion	because	it	will	limit	states’	sovereign	exercise	over	border	management.		Negative	 elements:	 Despite	 the	 reference	 to	 human	 rights,	 Objective	 11	 does	 not	mention	 the	 respect	 to	 the	 right	 to	 privacy	 and	protection	 of	 personal	 data	 explicitly.	This	 is	 worrying	 because	 if	 the	 inclusion	 of	 pre-screening	 measures	 and	 the	 use	 of	modern	 technology	 are	 read	 together,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Objective	 11	 acknowledges	 the	possible	use	of	data	mining	platforms	 in	relation	to	risk	assessment	and	biometrics	as	parts	 of	 border	 controls.	 These	means	 are	 particularly	 serious	 interferences	with	 the	right	to	privacy	and	personal	data	protection	because	they	involve	use	of	a	wide-ranging	information	 on	 individuals	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 identify	 them.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	disappointing	 that	 Objective	 11	 does	 not	 include	 a	 prohibition	 against	 discrimination	even	though	it	introduces	data	mining	platforms.		
Commentary:		In	general,	border	management	has	been	seen	as	an	aspect	of	national	security,	and	thus	the	 exercise	 of	 state	 sovereignty.	 Therefore,	 states	 have	 relied	 on	 the	 protection	 of	national	 security	and	 their	 sovereignty	 in	order	 to	dodge	 claims	against	human	 rights	violations	by	their	measures	of	border	governance.		Objective	11,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 cross-border	 co-operation	and	 the	 respect	of	human	rights,	is	welcome	because	it	transforms	borders	into	inter-state	governance	rather	than	a	 sovereign	 exercise;	 a	 move	 that	 ensures	 human	 rights	 in	 border	 management.	However,	 it	does	not	pay	particular	attention	to	the	right	to	privacy	and	personal	data	protection	when	putting	new	technology	at	 the	centre	of	border	governance	measures	(para.	 c).	 Although	 the	 reference	 to	 ‘modern	 technology’	 is	 wide	 enough	 to	 cover	 all	
measures	that	can	emerge	in	the	future,	the	current	trend	is	the	collection	and	storage	of	information	 on	 individuals	 crossing	 the	 borders,	 and	mining	 these	 database	 to	 detect	those	who	might	pose	a	 threat	 to	national	 security.	This	 information	does	not	have	 to	derive	 from	 the	 state-controlled	 documents,	 and	 as	 Objective	 11	 mentions,	 can	 be	outsourced	 to	private	 authorities	 such	 as	 air	 carriers.	 Such	 information	gathering	 and	storage	encroach	upon	the	right	to	privacy	and	personal	data	protection	of	individuals,	and	 thus	 it	 is	 disappointing	 that	Objective	11	does	not	 explicitly	 refer	 to	 these	 rights.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	mentioned	rights	are	not	recognised	in	the	UN	Global	Compact	on	Migration	at	all.	Objectives	1,	3,	8,	and	22	refer	to	these	rights	as	they	concern	the	use	of	 information	 on	 individuals,	 albeit	 for	 different	 reasons.	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 these	objective,	it	is	still	not	clear	by	what	the	rules	on	using	personal	information	would	be.	The	 UN	 Guidelines	 for	 the	 Regulation	 of	 Computerized	 Personal	 Data	 (A/Res/45/95)	can	provide	guidance	on	the	matter.		Another	 point	 of	 concern	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 prohibition	 against	 discrimination.	 This	prohibition	 is	particularly	 important	when	data	mining	platforms	are	at	stake	because	systemic	 bias	 could	 be	 embedded	 in	 these	 platforms.	 The	 issue	 becomes	 all	 the	more	troubling	due	to	the	lack	of	transparency	involved	in	the	data	mining	platforms	and	the	question	on	the	accuracy	of	the	information	obtained	from	private	authorities	(i.e.	air	carriers)	because	more	often	than	 not	 the	 acquisition	 of	 this	 information	 from	 individuals	 is	 not	 regulated.	OHCHR	Recommended	Principles	and	Guidelines	on	Human	Rights	at	International	Borders,	to	which	Objective	11	refers,	provides	a	non-discrimination	clause.	So	do	other	objectives	in	 the	UN	Global	 Compact	 on	Migration	 (for	 example,	 Objective	 15).	 According	 to	 the	concerns	as	to	the	data	mining	platforms	mentioned	above,	such	a	clause	should	not	be	excluded	from	Objective	11.		Finally,	other	questions	ensue	in	relation	to	the	rules	on	how	information	obtained	will	be	 used.	Will	 this	 be	 shared	with	 law	 enforcement	 authorities	 of	 the	 state	 for	 which	individual	 seeks	 to	 enter?	What	 will	 be	 the	 due	 process	 rights	 of	 individuals	 against	border	officials’	decision	on	the	basis	of	the	use	of	technology?	Objective	11	references	to	 strengthening	 due	 process	 and	 oversight	 of	 procedures	 for	 the	 border	 officials’	assessment	 (para.	 e),	 but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 overtly	 acknowledge	 due	 process	 and	oversight	of	the	use	of	technology.	This	is	particularly	important	given	that	the	level	of	protection	afforded	to	personal	information	varies	in	countries.		
OBJECTIVE	12:	Strengthen	procedures	and	mechanisms	for	status	determination	Boldizsár	Nagy,	Central	European	University		Positive	 elements:	 The	 intention	 to	 demand	 every	 state	 to	 have	 an	 “effective,	 human	rights	based	and	protection-sensitive	mechanism	and	procedure”	in	order	to	identify	all	migrants	 and	 determine	 their	 status	 is	 very	 positive.	 That	 entails	 the	 welcome	preservation	of	the	difference	between	those	in	need	of	(international)		protection	and	those	 not,	 a	 differentiation	 needed	 as	 long	 as	 a	 qualitatively	 freer	 global	 migration	regime	does	not	 take	shape.	The	 text	definitely	extends	 to	 those	who	are	displaced	by	“disasters	and	crisis”,	which	suggests	that	people	fleeing		natural	disasters,	including	the	(forced)	migration	induced	by	slow	onset	or	rapid	environmental	changes	is	also	subject	to	 a	 “status	 determination”,	 whatever	 that	 status	 may	 be.	 The	 attention	 to	 certain		
groups	with	special	(procedural)	needs,	like	victims	of	trafficking,	children,	persons	with	gender-sensitivities	is	exemplary.		Negative	elements:	The	 language	of	 the	objective	 is	not	based	on	a	clear	use	of	 terms.		Admitting	that	everything	can	not	be	jam-packed	into	five	paragraphs,	a	short	reference	to	other	procedural	needs	of	the	migrants	(like	suffering	from	PTSD)	and	to	the		cross-cultural	 communication	 capacities	of	 the	 first	 responders	and	government	officials	 	 in	point	b)	and	c)	would	be	well	placed.			It	 is	 unclear	 to	 whether	 	 only	 the	 first	 “referral”	 phase	 of	 status	 determination	 is	governed	 by	 this	 objective	 or	 its	 intention	 is	 to	 fix	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 all	 status	determination	procedures,	 including	those	ending	in	removal	 from	the	territory	or	the	opposite,		recognition	as	a	refugee.	The	objective	remains	silent	on	the	possibility	to	be	legally	represented	at	all	stages	of	the	status	determination	procedures,	including	those	not	raising	issues	of	international	protection.	The	objectives	of	the	Compact	as	presently	formulated	do	not	contain	cross	references	either	to	other	objectives	of	the	Compact		or	to	 the	 Global	 Compact	 on	 Refugees	 (let	 alone	 to	 relevant	 treaties).	 In	 the	 context	 of	status	 determination,	 vulnerabilities	 addressed	 in	 objective	 7,	 detention	 discussed	 in	objective	13,	 and	 the	preparation	of	 the	Global	Compact	on	Refugees	are	of	particular	importance	and	perhaps	should	be	mentioned	in	objective	12.		Commentary		Groups		of	humans	arriving	at	the	border	are	mixed,	but	their	entitlements	are	different,	depending	on	their	 life	 facts	which	must	be	ascertained	as	soon	as	possible.	Therefore	the	 intention	 of	 the	 objective	 to	 retain	 the	 difference	 between	 refugees	 and	 other	migrants	is	welcome.	Similarly	the	human	rights	based	approach	calling	for	an	effective	procedure	 	 and	 timely	 referral	 is	 vital	 in	 light	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 extremely	 long	 and	occasionally	meaningless	procedures	in	some	jursidictions.				However,	two	types	of	uncertainties	blur	the	perimeters	of	the	objective:	(a)	 Does	 the	 objective	 only	 address	 the	 first	 encounter,	 the	 “border	 moment”	 when	those	applying	for	protection	and	those	not	applying	may	be	separated	and	referred	to	two	different	types	of	status	determination	procedures,	or	is	the	objective	covering	the	substantive	status	determination	procedures	as	well.	Much	of	the	text	suggests	the	first,	but	 the	 chapeau	 of	 the	 text	 and	 the	 reference	 to	 “all	 stages	 	 of	 the	 migration	 cycle”	suggests	 otherwise,	 as	 well	 as	 	 subpara	 c)	 which	 speaks	 of	 status	 determination	mechanisms	“including”	-	but	then	not	limited	to	-		measures	at	the	border		and	places	of	first	arrival.	(b)	The	other	type	of	uncertainty	relates	to	the	terms	used.	The	chapeau	once	refers	to	“all	 migrants”,	 once	 to	 “migrants	 and	 refugees”.	 Are	 refugees	migrants	 or	 not,	 in	 this	context?	 	 Subpara	 a)	 adds	 asylum	 seekers	 to	 refugees	 and	 migrants	 and	 also	 those	“displaced	in	the	context	of	disasters	and	crisis”.	Are	asylum	seekers	not	refugees,	and	therefore	are	 they	not	 covered	by	 the	chapeau?	Unlikely.	 In	 light	of	 the	EU	acquis	one	may	ask:	 	 “are	beneficiaries	of	 subsidiary	protection	 included	 in	 the	 term	 ‘refugees’	 ”?	The	choice	is	painful:	monotonous	use	of	terms,	unattractive	to	the	everyday	reader,	but	legally	intelligible	or	flexible	use	of	the	words	not	allowing	claims	of	legal	character	to	be	based	on	the	objective.		
The	reference	to	those	“displaced”		in	the	context	of	disaster	elegantly	circumvents	the	bitter	 debates	 on	 whether	 environmental	 or	 climate	 refugees	 exist	 and	 points	 to	 the	efforts	of	the	Platform	on	Disaster	Displacement	which	also	transcended	those	debates.		Keeping	 the	 text	 succinct	 is	 important	 but	 a	 few	 further	 guarantees	 perhaps	 should	make	 into	 the	 shortlist.	 A	 reference	 to	 intercultural	 education	 may	 be	 similarly	important	 as	 the	 human-rights	 training,	 as	 the	 humane	 treatment	 of	 migrants	 is	preconditioned	 on	 the	 capability	 of	 those	 encountering	 the	 arriving	 migrants	 to	understand	 their	 motivations,	 fears	 and	 behavioural	 patterns.	 It	 is	 an	 asymmetric	situation,	the	same	can	not	be	expected	from	the	migrant,	meeting	is	not	at	halfway,	the	authorities	 and	 others	 receiving	 the	 migrants	 must	 be	 forward-coming.	 Access	 to	 a	lawyer	 in	 refugee	 status	determination	procedures	and	 in	 foreign	policing	procedures	possibly	leading	to	expulsion	and	removal	is	essential.	This	guarantee	could	find	its	way	to	the	text.			If	the	objectives	will	not	have	cross-references	to	each-other	then	the	suggestion	to	refer	to	 at	 least	 objectives	 7	 and	 13	 is	 moot.	 However,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 status	determination	is	a	juncture	between	this	Compact	and	the	Global	Compact	on	Refugees	that	relationship	should	be	clarified	both	 in	 the	 language	used	and	 in	 the	allocation	of	guarantees	between	this	text	and	the	other	Compact.	
	
OBJECTIVE	13:	Use	migration	detention	only	as	a	last	resort	and	work	towards	
alternatives	Dr	Justine	Stefanelli,	British	Institute	of	International	and	Comparative	Law		Positive	elements:	individualization.	This	is	an	excellent	and	important	part	of	detention	regulation.	 Making	 the	 decision	 to	 detain	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 which	 takes	 into	account	the	individual’s	specific	circumstances	forecloses	states’	ability	to	detain	groups	of	 people	 based	 on	 membership	 in	 a	 category,	 such	 as	 ‘foreign	 national	 offender’,	 a	practice	 that	 is	 carried	 out	 in	 many	 states	 today.	 It	 ensures	 that	 only	 people	 who	absolutely	need	to	be	detained	are	detained,	and	contributes	to	the	overall	reduction	of	the	use	of	detention.		Negative	elements:	Though	Objective	13	refers	to	the	need	for	detention	to	be	“for	the	shortest	period	of	time”,	it	is	disappointing	to	see	that	a	maximum	period	of	detention	is	not	part	of	the	Objective.	This	is	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	a	due	diligence	requirement,	which	 would	 ensure	 that	 states	 undertake	 migration	 processes	 with	 the	 utmost	diligence,	whether	they	be	decisions	to	admit	or	to	deport/remove.	Without	a	maximum,	people	face	indefinite	detention	and	are	often	reliant	upon	the	will	of	the	state	to	carry	out	the	relevant	process.		
Commentary:	The	use	of	detention	as	a	tool	of	immigration	enforcement	has	become	a	routine	part	of	immigration	 control,	 despite	 evidence	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 due	 process	 violations	 in	many	states.		Objective	13,	which	seeks	to	ensure	that	detention	is	used	as	a	last	resort	and	that	the	feasibility	of	alternatives	is	fully	explored,	is	a	welcome	addition	to	the	UN	Global	Compact	on	Migration.	Where	detention	is	used,	Objective	13	requires	officials	to	make	 detention	 determinations	 on	 an	 individual	 basis,	 taking	 into	 account	 whether	detention	 is	 proportionate	 and	 necessary.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 a	 necessity	 requirement	 is	
particularly	 welcome	 and	 is	 absent	 from	many	 legal	 frameworks,	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	Council	of	Europe	and	 its	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	The	requirement	of	necessity	helps	reduce	the	use	of	detention	by	ensuring	that	alternatives	are	employed	unless	 a	 specific	 case	 necessarily	 merits	 the	 use	 of	 detention,	 for	 example,	 if	 the	individual	 poses	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 flight,	 or	 is	 a	 genuine	 and	 present	 danger	 to	 the	community.		Objective	13	also	requires	states	to	take	detention	decisions	“in	full	compliance	with	due	process	 and	 procedural	 safeguards”,	 another	 welcome	 addition,	 considering	 that	 so	many	states	apply	an	inferior	level	of	due	process	protections	to	immigration	detainees.	Detainees	 should	 have,	 as	 a	 minimum,	 the	 right	 to	 written	 reasons	 for	 detention,	 an	opportunity	to	respond	to	any	allegations	against	them	and	rights	of	appeal	or	review.			Despite	 these	positives,	Objective	13	 lacks	a	 few	key	provisions	on	detention.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	Objective	13	does	not	require	states	to	establish	a	maximum	period	of	detention,	but	instead	states	that	detention	should	be	“for	the	shortest	period	of	time”.	The	lack	of	a	maximum	is	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	a	due	diligence	requirement,	which	would	 ensure	 that	 states	 undertake	 migration	 processes,	 whether	 it	 be	 decisions	 to	admit	or	deportation/removal,	with	 the	utmost	diligence.	Without	a	maximum,	people	face	indefinite	detention	and	are	often	reliant	upon	the	will	of	the	state	to	carry	out	the	relevant	process.	In	addition,	an	important	part	of	ensuring	that	detention	fully	complies	with	due	process	is	the	right	to	an	attorney,	legally-aided,	if	possible.	Finally,	a	right	to	automatic	 judicial	review	of	the	order	to	detain	would	help	to	ensure	that	detention	is	used	only	when	necessary,	 that	 it	 is	proportionate,	and	that	due	process	requirements	are	respected.		
OBJECTIVE	15:	Provide	access	to	basic	social	services	for	migrants	Dr.	Bethany	Hastie,	Peter	A	Allard	School	of	Law	University	of	British	Columbia,	Canada		Positive	 elements:	 Incorporation	 of	 firewalls.	 Objective	 15	 includes,	 under	 paragraph	(c),	 a	 recommendation	 that	 “firewalls”	 are	 set	 up	 between	 service	 providers	 and	immigration	 enforcement	 agencies.	 The	 concept	 of	 “firewalls”	 protects	 irregularly	present	migrants,	who	may	desire	or	need	access	to	public	services,	by	prohibiting	the	sharing	of	client	information	with	other	public	bodies,	notably	immigration	enforcement	authorities.	 Firewalls	 may	 be	 achieved	 through	 policies	 that	 prohibit	 information	sharing	between	public	bodies,	prohibit	reporting	to	immigration	or	related	authorities,	or	 prohibit	 access	 to	 client	 information	 by	 immigration	 or	 related	 authorities.	“Firewalls”	 are	essential	 in	order	 for	 irregularly	present	migrants	 to	 seek	out	 and	use	necessary	 services	without	 the	ever-present	 threat	of	denunciation	and	deportation,	 a	threat	which	is	a	widely	noted	barrier	for	migrants	accessing	services.	
	Negative	 elements:	 While	 objective	 15	 commits	 to	 ensuring	 the	 accessibility	 of	 basic	social	 services,	 including	 health	 care,	 education,	 housing	 and	 social	 protection,	 the	actionable	 comments	 focus	 most	 prominently	 on	 health	 care	 and	 education,	 with	 no	substantive	commentary	on	housing,	and	no	mention	of	other	necessary	public	services,	such	as	 legal	 aid.	Migrants	 are	known	 to	 face	discrimination	 in	 accessing	housing	and	shelter,	 and	 they	 are	 often	 excluded	 from	 eligibility	 for	 public	 legal	 services	 and	representation.	 While	 Objective	 15	 includes	 recommendations	 to	 ensure	 non-discriminatory	 access	 to	 and	 delivery	 of	 basic	 social	 services,	 which	 might	 include	
housing	and	 legal	aid,	 the	 lack	of	specific	commentary	directed	towards	these	services	establishes	a	failure	to	appreciate	the	interconnected	needs	of	migrants,	and	prioritizes	very	basic	services	over	a	holistic	approach	to	managing	migrants’	needs	experiences	in	a	host	country.		
Commentary	
	Objective	15,	which	commits	States	to	develop	“non-discriminatory	policies	in	order	to	provide	migrants,	regardless	of	their	migration	status,	access	to	and	ensure	delivery	of	basic	social	services,	including	health	care,	education,	housing	and	social	protection”	is	a	welcome	and	much-needed	recommendation	in	the	UN	Global	Compact	on	Migration.			Migrants	 are	 often,	 either	 formally	 or	 practically,	 excluded	 from	 access	 to	 public	services,	 including	 health	 care,	 education,	 housing,	 legal	 aid,	 social	 benefits	 such	 as	employment	insurance,	protection	of	law	enforcement	bodies,	labour	organizations,	and	others.	 In	 some	 cases,	 migrants,	 especially	 irregularly	 present	 migrants,	 are	 formally	excluded	from	entitlement	to	such	services	under	law.	In	other	cases,	migrants	who	pay	into	public	schemes,	such	as	temporary	foreign	workers,	are	later	deprived	of	the	ability	to	access	those	benefits.	In	many	cases,	practical	barriers	to	access	and	delivery	of	public	services	 arise	 from	 discriminatory	 treatment	 and,	 for	 irregularly	 present	 migrants,	 a	fear	 of	 denunciation	 and	 deportation.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that,	 under	international	 law,	 migrants	 have	 rights	 that	 correlate	 to	 an	 entitlement	 to	 public	services	in	areas	such	as	health	care,	education,	non-discrimination	in	employment,	and	others.		Objective	 15	 seeks	 to	 address	 the	 legal	 and	 social	 barriers	migrants	 face	 in	 accessing	public	 services	 by	 recommending	 that	 States	 develop	 non-discriminatory	 policies	 to	ensure	access	to	and	delivery	of	these	services,	and	importantly,	by	encouraging	States	to	 adopt	 “firewalls”	 between	 service	 providers	 and	 immigration	 enforcement	authorities.	Firewalls	operate	to	prohibit	information	sharing	between	service	providers	and	 immigration	enforcement	authorities,	 in	order	 to	alleviate	 the	 fears	 that	migrants,	especially	irregularly	present	migrants,	may	have	in	seeking	out	services	they	may	need.	Firewalls	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 prohibiting	 access	 to	 client	 information	 by	 immigration	authorities,	 prohibiting	 service	 providers	 from	 reporting	 client	 information	 and	immigration	status	to	immigration	authorities,	and	other	measures.	This	is	a	significant	step	forward	in	alleviating	the	practical	barriers	migrants	may	face	in	accessing	public	services.		However,	 Objective	 15	 does	 not	 define	 the	 concept	 of	 “firewalls”	 or	 provide	 detailed	guidance	 on	 how	 States	 can	 operationalize	 firewalls,	 nor	 to	 what	 bodies	 they	 should	attach.	 This	 diminishes	 the	 potential	 impact	 that	 this	 recommendation	 might	 have,	considering	 that	 there	 are	 many	 measures	 of	 varying	 effectiveness	 that	 could	 be	encompassed	within	 the	 concept	 of	 “firewalls”,	 and	 given	 the	many	 different	 kinds	 of	public	 services	 that	 migrants	 may	 need	 access	 to.	 For	 example,	 while	 a	 “firewall”	measure	might	 prohibit	mandatory	 reporting	 on	 client	 immigration	 status	 by	 service	providers,	 a	 more	 effective	 measure	 would	 prohibit	 both	 voluntary	 and	 mandatory	reporting.	In	addition,	while	objective	15	focuses	on	pressing	public	service	needs,	such	as	health	care	and	education,	firewalls	ought	to	be	in	place	for	a	broad	array	of	service	providers,	 including	 in	 respect	 of	 legal	 aid,	 housing,	 labour	 inspectors,	 and	 others.	
Finally,	 “firewalls”	 contemplate	 the	prior	 collection	of	 immigration	 status	 information,	which	may	not	be	necessary	in	all	circumstances,	and	which	could	have	been	set	out	in	a	complementary	 actionable	 comment	 to	 bolster	 the	 underlying	 purpose	 of	 the	recommendation.		Objective	15	provides	specific	guidance	on	issues	of	access	to	health	care	and	education,	which	 undoubtedly	 represent	 pressing	 needs	 for	 many	 migrants.	 However,	 by	prioritizing	 these	 services,	 and	 failing	 to	 mention	 other	 important	 services,	 such	 as	access	 to	 legal	 counsel,	Objective	15	 fails	 to	 fully	 appreciate	 the	 interconnected	needs	and	experiences	that	migrants	have	which	could	be	addressed	through	access	to	a	broad	array	 of	 public	 services.	 Practical	 barriers	 for	 migrants	 accessing	 public	 services	 are	documented	 in	 relation	 to	 legal	 aid,	 protection	 of	 law	 enforcement,	 housing,	 social	assistance	 and	 public	 insurance	 schemes,	 and	 labour	 organizations,	 among	 others.	Needs	 related	 to	 these	 service	 areas	 may	 also	 be	 interconnected;	 for	 example,	 a	temporary	 migrant	 worker	 who	 is	 experiencing	 abusive	 treatment	 may	 require	assistance	from	legal	counsel,	temporary	social	assistance	benefits,	and	potentially	even	shelter	if	they	live	in	employer-provided	housing.	A	holistic	approach	to	ensuring	non-discriminatory	and	safe	access	to	public	services	would	highlight	the	interconnected	and	myriad	needs	migrants	have,	and	emphasize	the	need	for	a	response	that	acknowledges	and	accounts	 for	 the	array	of	public	services	 that	might,	 together,	provide	an	effective	response	to	migrants’	needs.		Finally,	 Objective	 15	 prescribes	 that	 States	 should	 enact	 laws	 to	 explicitly	 prohibit	discrimination	 on	 “all	 grounds,	 including	 race,	 colour,	 descent,	 or	 national	 or	 ethnic	origin”.	While	 this	 is	an	 important	recommendation,	and	migrants	are	often	subject	 to	discrimination	 based	 on	 these	 grounds,	 this	 recommendation	 would	 have	 been	strengthened	 by	 prohibiting	 discrimination	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 citizenship	 status,	 in	 at	least	 areas	 of	 fundamental	 and	 emergent	 need,	 such	 as	 access	 to	 basic	 or	 emergency	health	 care,	 primary	 education,	 emergency	 shelter,	 immediate	 police	 assistance,	 and	others.	 Although	 migrants’	 access	 to	 public	 services	 should	 avoid	 a	 prioritization	 or	hierarchy,	 as	 noted	 above,	 excluding	 migrants	 from	 fundamental	 and	 emergency	services	on	the	basis	of	citizenship	status	produces	particularly	serious	consequences.	In	relation	 to,	 at	 a	 minimum,	 services	 that	 are	 reflective	 of	 fundamental	 and	 universal	rights	under	international	law,	non-discrimination	ought	to	include	citizenship	status	as	a	protected	ground.		
Objective	17:	Eliminate	all	forms	of	discrimination	and	promote	fact-based	public	
discourse	to	shape	perceptions	of	migration	Kathryn	Allinson,	PhD	Candidate	Queen	Mary,	University	of	London	
	Positive	 elements:	 ‘Eliminating	 all	 forms	 of	 discrimination	 and	 promoting	 fact-based	discourse’.	 The	 language	 is	 positive	 and	 highlights	 the	 abhorrence	 of	 discrimination	whether	 it	 be	 ‘expressions,	 acts	 or	 manifestations	 of	 racism,	 racial	 discrimination,	xenophobia	or	related	intolerance	against	all	migrants’	and	encouraging	States	to	ensure	they	have	adequate	legal	frameworks	in	place	to	prevent,	punish	and	remedy	such	acts	is	 an	 important	 step.	Taking	 forward	 the	NY	Declaration’s	 commitment	 to	 eradicating	xenophobia	and	racism	is	essential	 in	promoting	a	positive	dialogue	around	migration.	The	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	 media,	 especially	 through	 honest	 and	 fact-based	reporting,	 is	 important	in	the	current	climate	of	populism	and	right-wing	rhetoric.	The	
focus	 on	 local	 level,	 community-based	 approach	 to	 preventing	 discrimination	 is	 also	important	as	it	is	at	this	grass-roots	that	real	change	in	perceptions	can	begin.	
	Negative	elements:	The	proposed	action	is	quite	coercive	and	engages	the	private	sector	in	 particular.	 The	 focus	 on	 ‘shaping	 perceptions	 in	 public	 discourse’	while	 positive,	 is	only	 one	 part	 of	 eliminating	 discrimination.	 It	 is	worrying	 that	 Objective	 17	 does	 not	highlight	 the	 legal	principle	of	non-discrimination,	 by	which	States	 are	bound	 to	 treat	migrants	 equally	 to	 citizens,	 as	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 eliminating	 discrimination.	While	the	 first	 sentence	 of	 para	 35	 could	 relate	 to	 obligations	 on	 States	 to	 eliminate	discrimination	 in	 their	policies,	and	part	(e)	proposes	regional	complaint	mechanisms,	the	principle	of	non-discrimination	and	its	centrality	in	this	issue	is	not	made	clear.	The	commitment	to	eliminating	discrimination	must	start	here.	
	
Commentary:		On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 objective	 aspires	 to	 be	 ‘in	 conformity	with	 international	 human	rights	law’	(IHRL)	but	on	the	other	it	fails	to	address	the	role	of	the	State	in	applying	its	laws	 non-discriminatorily	 towards	 migrants.	 Nowhere	 else	 in	 the	 zero	 draft	 is	discrimination	explicitly	focused	on	although	it	is	mentioned	in	objective	13	relating	to	detention,	 in	objective	15	in	relation	to	access	to	social	services	and	objective	16(d)	to	promote	 inclusion.	 The	 centrality	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 non-discrimination	 in	 the	application	 of	 IHRL	 and	 in	 eliminating	 discrimination	 is	 undisputed,	 yet	 inadequately	addressed	in	Objective	17.			The	focus	appears	to	be	on	how	State’s	can	reduce	discrimination	within	their	society.	It	fails	to	address	the	centrality	of	non-discrimination	of	migrants	in	the	application	of	the	law	and	protection	of	their	rights	as	outlined	in	Article	2	of	ICCPR	and	HRC	Gen	Comm	No	 15	 (1986).	 If	 State’s	 stopped	 undermining	 the	 principle	 of	 non-discrimination	 in	their	 application	 of	 the	 law	 towards	migrants,	 then	 public	 discourse	 and	 perceptions	would	follow.	State’s	cannot	just	‘talk	the	talk’	of	non-discrimination,	they	must	also	stop	using	a	migrant’s	status	as	a	mechanism	for	denying	or	 limiting	their	access	to	human	rights	and	protection.			Discrimination	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 migrant	 vulnerability	 as	 it	 undermines	 their	 access	 to	human	 rights	protection	and	pushes	 them	 into	a	position	of	 vulnerability.	A	migrant’s	vulnerability	 to	 refusal	 of	 admission	 or	 removal	 based	 upon	 their	 status,	 are	 key	 to	justifications	 for	 discrimination.	 It	 is	 this	 vulnerability	 that	 leads	 them	 to	 accept	limitations	 on	 their	 wider	 gamut	 of	 rights.	 State’s	 justify	 this	 denial	 of	 rights	 by	classifying	 a	 difference	 between	 migrants	 and	 citizens,	 where	 no	 such	 difference	 is	permitted	under	international	law.				As	a	result,	while	Article	17	takes	an	important	step	towards	eliminating	discrimination	towards	 migrants	 within	 society,	 this	 cannot	 be	 done	 without	 first	 a	 change	 in	 the	practises	 of	 States	 in	 ensuring	 their	 compliance	 with	 international	 legal	 standards	relating	to	the	principle	of	non-discrimination.	Only	then	can	real	change	start	to	happen	in	public	policy	and	discourse.		
OBJECTIVE	 18:	 Invest	 in	 skills	 development	 and	 facilitate	 recognition	 of	 skills,	
qualifications	and	competences	E.	Fornalé,	F.	Cristani,	A.	Yildiz,	World	Trade	Institute,	University	of	Berne,	Switzerland	
	Positive	 elements:	 It	 is	 very	 positive	 that	 the	 draft	 includes	 reference	 to	 migrant	workers	 at	 all	 skills	 level.	 This	 can	make	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 prevent	 the	 so-called	de-skilled	phenomenon	and	to	fill	existing	protection	gaps	between	highly	skilled	and	 low	 skilled	 migrant	 workers	 and	 it	 can	 open	 up	 possibilities	 for	 cross-border	employment	 to	 an	 increase	number	 of	migrants	workers.	 Similarly,	 the	 recognition	of	global	standards	and	standardized	documentation	is	crucial	for	migrant	workers.		Negative	elements:	It	can	be	dangerous	to	avoid	making	clear	that	all	migrant	workers,	regular	or	irregular,	have	access	to	recognition	procedures.	In	the	content	of	each	sub-commitment	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 aim	 to	 include	 regulated/not-regulated	 professions.	There	 seems	 also	 to	 lack	 a	 reference	 to	 what	 kind	 of	 recognition	 the	 Zero	 Draft	 is	addressing,	whether	professional	or	 academic	or	other,	 as	 it	 can	be	 confusing	 to	 treat	them	 all	 the	 same.	 Moreover,	 the	 present	 sub-commitments	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 pay	attention	to	the	distinction	between	temporary	and	permanent	migration	when	dealing	with	skills	recognition.	
	
Commentary:	
Substantial	 level:	 the	majority	of	recognition	approaches/techniques	aim	to	ensure	the	equivalence	 among	 different	 regulatory	 systems.	 Several	 attempts	 to	 put	 in	 place	harmonization	have	 failed.	There	needs	 to	be	established	a	more	gradual	process	 that	can	 aim	 to	 harmonise	 in	 the	 future	 but	 is	 more	 realistic.	 The	 focus	 on	 “innovative	instruments”	is	very	relevant.	This	can	promote	the	development	of	new	strategies	and	re-new	 the	 attention	 on	 the	 current	 implementation,	 quite	 problematic,	 of	 existing	instruments.		
Procedural	 level:	 The	 instruments	 mentioned	 are	 very	 well	 suited	 for	 ensuring	 the	recognition	 of	 highly	 skilled	migrant	workers.	 It	 is	 less	 clear	 under	which	 agreement	low-skilled	migrants	workers	can	be	really	included.	The	potential	of	MRAs	can	be	more	beneficial	if	there	is	a	connection	with	migration	measures.		What	 appears	 very	 positive	 is	 the	 clear	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 to	 put	 in	 place	 a	normative	framework	at	the	international	level	that	can	support	the	recognition	process	in	a	 structural	way.	The	reference	 to	existing	 instruments,	as	bilateral	 labour	mobility	and	mutual	recognition	agreements,	or	new	approaches,	as	global	skills	partnership,	is	a	good	 sign	 in	 this	 direction.	 In	 fact,	 these	 instruments,	with	 their	 ‘mutual	 component’,	have	 the	 potential	 to	 promote	 a	 progressive	 reallocation	 of	 regulatory	 authority	 from	the	host	 country	 to	 the	 country	 of	 destination	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 qualifications	 and	skills	of	migrant	workers.		To	 be	 more	 inclusive	 the	 recognition	 process	 needs	 to	 include	 a	 broader	 set	 of	participants.	 The	 identification	 of	 the	 ‘relevant	 stakeholders’	 national	 governments	should	engage	with	are	not	very	clear.	There	is	a	complete	absence	of	any	reference	to	professional	 organizations:	 it	 can	 be	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 implement	 any	 kind	 of	agreement/procedure	if	they	are	not	involved	in	the	establishment	of	the	procedure	for	regulated	 professions.	 Their	 involvement	 may	 overcome	 protectionist	 mindset.	Employers:	 need	 to	 be	 trained	 and	 involved	 too,	 to	 be	 ready	 to	 recognize	 acquired	competences	in	particular	in	unregulated	sectors.		
There	 are	 some	 gaps	 however;	 skills	 recognition/skills	 matching:	 increase	 data	collection	 through	 meticulous	 analysis	 of	 market	 needs	 to	 be	 emphasized,	 it	 is	 not	possible	to	fully	assess	what	skills	to	what	level	are	needed	–	to	mitigate	skills	shortage	and	 to	 create	 a	 global	 platform	on	 skills.	 The	 overall	 skills	matching	 system	 seems	 to	stand	a	bit	in	the	background:	in	particular,	it	is	not	very	clear	whether	it	also	includes	the	 improvement	 of	 local	 training	 (in	 host	 countries)	 for	 migrants	 with	 foreign	qualifications	in	order	to	make	them	meet	the	local	professional	standards		Best	 Practices:	 increase	 data	 collection	 of	 existing	 approaches/practices	 to	 get	 an	overview	on	what	it	is	really	working	and	what	affect	their	implementation.	Explore	the	potential	 implications	 to	 adopt	 a	 top-down	 or	 bottom-up	 approach.	 What	 role	 for	compensatory	measures?	 These	 instruments	 can	 fill	 potential	 gaps	 and	 allow	migrant	workers	 to	 acquire	 missing	 competences.	 Additional	 data	 on	 existing	 practices	 is	needed.		Education:	 it	 seems	 to	 lack	 a	 coordination	 with	 training	 and	 education	 system	differences	in	education	systems	at	the	national	level	should	be	addressed	as	a	first	step.	Build	global	skills	partnerships	amongst	countries	that	strengthen	training	capacities	it	is	 yet	 not	 very	 clear	whether	 it	 includes	 also	 the	 issue	 of	 education,	 and	who	 should	participate	in	the	‘skills	partnership’		Financial	mechanisms	are	needed	to	increase	partnership	in	skills	development,	training	and	certificate	programmes.	In	addition,	the	role	of	recruitment	agencies	and	the	issue	they	receive	payments	from	migrant	workers	rather	than	employers	-	which	give	labour	recruiters	an	incentive	to	place	workers	who	pay	the	largest	fee	rather	than	those	with	the	best	skills	for	the	job	–	seems	to	be	not	adequately	addressed.		Overall,	the	topic	of	recognition	seems	to	be	a	little	fragmented	in	the	Zero	Draft:	we	can	find	 some	 hints	 also	 in	 Objective	 19,	 actionable	 commitment	 c)	 and	 h),	 as	 regards	knowledge	 and	 skills	 transfer	 of	 migrants	 and	 diasporas,	 in	 Objective	 21,	 actionable	commitment	 i),	 as	 regards	 the	 issue	 of	 skills	 recognition	 in	 case	 of	 readmission	 and	reintegration	 and	 in	 Objective	 5,	 actionable	 commitments	 e)	 and	 h),	 as	 regards	 the	possibility	to	reduce	visa	processing	timeframes	in	order	to	foster	efficient	and	effective	skills-matching	 programmes	 and	 the	 explicit	 involvement	 of	 the	 ‘private	 sector	 and	trade	unions’	 in	 skills-matching	procedures;	however,	 in	Objective	18	 these	 topics	are	not	 either	 mentioned	 or	 fully	 addressed,	 making	 it	 questionable	 their	 efficient	 and	structured	implementation.		
Objective	19:	Create	conditions	for	migrants	and	diasporas	to	fully	contribute	to	
sustainable	development	in	all	countries.	Tugba	Basaran,	Centre	d	Etudes	sur	les	conflits,	la	liberte	et	la	securite,	Paris;	visiting	scholar	Harvard	University		Positive	elements:	It	is	important	to	empower	migrants	and	diasporas	and	harness	their	benefits	for	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals.		Negative	 elements:	 	Migrants	 and	 diaspora	 financial	 contributions	 account	 already	to	more	 than	 three	 times	 the	 official	 development	 assistance	 and	more	 foreign	 direct	investments	 to	 almost	 every	 developing	 country.	 The	 contributions	 of	 migrants	 and	
diasporas	 should	 not	 be	 used	 as	 a	 substitute	 for	 other	 forms	 of	 assistance	 and	investments	 or	 as	 a	 way	 to	 diminish	 responsibilities	 of	 international	 cooperation.	Further,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 underlined	 that	 diasporas	 are	 citizens	 of	 their	 respective	countries,	a	point	of	contestation	in	public	and	popular	discourse,	particularly	in	times	of	 securitization.	 Hence	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 employ	 a	 wording	 that	 emphasizes	 the	 citizen	component,	such	as	migrant	and	citizens	(with	diasporic	links).		
Commentary	In	many	countries	which	perceive	themselves	as	destinations	for	migrants,	in	particular	for	 migrants	 from	 less	 wealthy	 countries,	 the	 issue	 of	 integration	 is	 vivid.	 The	underlying	 assumption	of	 the	public	policy	of	 integration	of	migrants	 is	 that	migrants	should	become	part	of	civil	society	 in	the	country	where	they	live	and	should	not	only	comply	with	the	laws	(criminal,	civil	and	administrative)	but	adapt	to	the	social	norms	which	are	dominant	in	their	‘host’	country.	Yet,	a	definition	of	integration	is	as	elusive	as	the	definition	of	diaspora.	What	does	 it	mean	to	be	 integrated?	How	is	 this	measured?	What	does	a	migrant	need	to	do	to	be	integrated?	All	of	these	questions	depend	on	what	the	definition	of	integration	is.	There	have	been	some	efforts	to	design	tools	to	measure	integration	 which	 have	 been	 well	 funded	 by	 institutions	 but	 nonetheless	 have	 been	much	 criticised	 by	 the	 academic	 community.	 At	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 debate	 is	 the	 elusive	definition	of	 integration	–	 the	 lack	of	 clear	 content	 to	definitions	used	means	 that	 the	measurements	are	 flawed.	One	approach	adopted	by	 some	researchers	 is	 to	 carry	out	surveys	of	whether	citizens	consider	 that	migrants	are	 integrated	but	 this	approach	 is	equally	 flawed	 as	 the	 person	 interviewed	 in	 effect	 becomes	 the	 arbiter	 of	 what	integration	means.5	
	
Objective	20:	Promote	faster,	safer	and	cheaper	transfer	of	remittances	and	foster	
financial	 inclusion	 of	 migrants	 Tugba	 Basaran,	 Centre	 d	 Etudes	 sur	 les	 conflits,	 la	liberte	et	la	securite,	Paris;	visiting	scholar	Harvard	University			Positive	elements:	The	zero	draft	correctly	underlines	that	the	cost	of	remittances	is	too	high	and	needs	to	meet	the	3	percent	target,	set	for	the	SDGs.	It	rightly	emphasizes	how	the	 reduction	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 remittances	 requires	 ‘removing	 obstacles	 to	 non-bank	remittance	 providers’	 and	 ensuring	 that	measures	 ‘to	 combat	 illicit	 financial	 flows	 do	not	impede	migrant	remittances’.			Negative	 elements:	 It	 needs	 to	 be	 stressed	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 remittances	 should	 not	 be	dependent	 of	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 person,	 whether	 citizen	 or	 migrant,	 regular	 or	irregular.	Full	 financial	 inclusion	 in	both	origin	and	host	 country	 should	be	promoted.	This	 includes	 the	 inclusion	 of	 non-bank	 remittance	 and/or	 alternative	 regulations	 as	well	as	the	availability	of	the	required	documentation	for	accessing	formal	channels	for	remittances.			Further,	family	remittances	should	be	understood	as	person-to-person	transfers:	sender	and	receivers	of	personal	remittances	should	not	be	disadvantaged	as	‘representatives’	of	 a	 country.	 Particularly	 recent	 propositions	 to	 tax	 remittances,	 to	 collect	 taxes	 for	 a	border	 wall,	 to	 enhance	 sanctions	 or	 to	 show	 other	 forms	 of	 disagreement	 with	 the	government	 and/or	policies	of	 a	 remittance-receiving	 state	 are	offensive	 to	 individual	
																																								 																				5	Paas,	Tiiu,	and	Vivika	Halapuu.	"Attitudes	towards	immigrants	and	the	integration	of	ethnically	diverse	societies."	Eastern	Journal	of	European	Studies	3.2	(2012).	
needs.	 Personal	 remittances	 should	be	 exempted	 from	 inter-state	political	 factors	 and	reasons.			
Commentary:			In	spite	of	progress,	the	cost	of	remittances	remains	above	the	3	percent	target	set	in	the	Sustainable	 Development	 Goals,	 with	 substantial	 variances	 across	 the	 globe.	 The	average	cost	of	remittances	is	close	to	8	percent,	ranging	to	up	to	20	percent	in	some	of	the	highest	 cost	 corridors	 in	Sub-Saharan	Africa	and	Pacific	 Islands	 (WB	2016).	These	are	 unnecessary	 losses,	 particularly	 for	 low-income	 migrants.	 Fostering	 financial	inclusion	 of	 migrants,	 both	 in	 countries	 of	 origin	 and	 destination,	 expanding	 the	outreach	of	financial	markets,	reducing	regulatory	and	security	obstacles	and	enhancing	technological	 innovations	 are	 crucial	 for	 faster,	 safer	 and	 cheaper	 transfer	 or	remittances.		
OBJECTIVE	 21:	 Cooperate	 in	 facilitating	 dignified	 and	 sustainable	 return,	
readmission	and	reintegration	Dr.	Izabella	Majcher,	Global	Detention	Project,	Geneva		Positive	 elements:	 The	 reiteration	 of	 the	 prohibition	 of	 collective	 expulsion;	prioritization	of	 the	voluntary	return	over	 forced	return;	agreements	 for	return	 to	 the	person’s	country	of	origin;	guardianship	for	children.			Negative	 elements:	 The	 lack	 of	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement	(paragraph	(e)	is	not	sufficiently	clear);	silence	about	the	right	to	respect	for	family	and	private	 life	 developed	 in	 the	 host	 country;	 possibility	 to	 return	 children	 to	 “reception	and	 care	 arrangement”	 in	 third	 countries	 rather	 than	 to	 their	 families;	 enhanced	“cooperation	 on	 identification”	 with	 the	 countries	 of	 origin	 without	 adequate	safeguards.			
Commentary:			Objective	 21	 enshrines	 several	 laudable	 principles	 yet,	 in	 overall,	 it	 places	disproportionately	 more	 attention	 on	 the	 process	 of	 return	 and	 post-return	reintegration	 than	 the	 legal	 safeguards	 preventing	 return.	 Besides	 the	 Refugee	Convention’s	 scheme	 of	 protection	 addressed	 in	 the	 Global	 Compact	 on	 Refugees,	international	human	rights	law	provides	for	a	number	of	safeguards	precluding	return.	As	 the	 recently	 appointed	 UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 Human	 Rights	 of	 Migrants,	Felipe	 González	 Morales,	 stressed	 in	 front	 of	 the	 General	 Assembly	 in	 October	 2017,	while	 “refugees	 need	 protection	 according	 to	 the	 1951	 refugee	 convention	 […]	 all	migrants	 need	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 rights	 according	 to	 international	 human	 rights	law.”	This	brief	commentary	addresses	these	three	stages	of	return.			First	 of	 all,	 return	 cannot	 be	 carried	 out	 if	 it	 would	 violate	 the	 prohibition	 of	 non-
refoulement.	 By	 virtue	 of	 article	 3	 of	 the	 Convention	 against	 Torture	 and	Other	 Cruel,	Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	 Treatment	 or	 Punishment	 and	 article	 7	 of	 the	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR),	no	person	can	be	sent	to	a	country	where	he	 faces	a	risk	of	 torture	or	 ill-treatment.	This	prohibition	 is	absolute.	Every	person	 is	afforded	the	protection	from	refoulement,	irrespective	of	the	person’s	conduct.	Secondly,	
pursuant	 to	 article	 17	 of	 the	 ICCPR,	 migrants	 should	 not	 be	 returned	 if	 it	 would	constitute	a	disproportionate	interference	with	their	family	and	private	life	developed	in	the	 host	 state.	 If	 children	 are	 involved,	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	 child	under	article	3	of	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	may	weigh	against	expulsion	of	one	of	his	parents.	Paragraph	(e)	falls	thus	short	of	states’	international	human	rights	obligations.	The	mention	of	due	process	guarantees	in	the	same	paragraph	is	welcome.	Indeed,	article	2(3)	of	the	ICCPR	lays	down	the	right	to	an	effective	remedy,	which	in	the	context	of	return	entails	 the	provision	of	sufficient	 information	about	 factual	and	 legal	reasons	for	one’s	return,	possibility	to	challenge	return	decision,	and	suspensive	effect	of	 appeal.	 Depending	 on	 the	 case,	 the	 right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy	 may	 also	 require	granting	legal	and	linguistic	assistance.			In	 terms	 of	 the	 process	 of	 return,	 it	 is	 commendable	 that	 paragraph	 (d)	 prioritizes	voluntary	return	over	forced	removal.	Yet,	allowing	the	person	to	leave	without	escorts	is	not	merely	ethically	sound	but	directly	implied	from	the	principle	of	proportionality,	premised	upon	the	very	rule	of	law.	It	is	laudable	that	Objective	21	requires	safe,	human	rights-based	and	dignified	 return.	 In	 the	 context	of	 forced	 return,	 these	principles	 are	translated	 into	 the	 compliance	 with	 the	 strict	 necessity	 and	 proportionality	 test	 in	relation	 to	 the	 use	 and	 amount	 of	 restraint	methods	 and	 force.	 The	 prohibition	 of	 ill-treatment	 and	unlawful	deprivation	of	 life	under	 articles	6	 and	7	of	 the	 ICCPR	entails	also	effective	investigation	into	allegations	of	unlawful	force	applied	during	deportation.	Cooperation	 on	 identification,	 focused	 on	 in	 paragraph	 (b),	 raises	 several	 protection	concerns	 and	 should	 never	 be	 sought	 in	 relation	 to	 rejected	 asylum	 seekers.	Readmission	agreements,	dealt	with	 in	paragraph	(a),	should	be	applicable	only	based	on	individual	assessment	of	any	risks	awaiting	the	person	upon	return.	The	prohibition	of	 refoulement	 precludes	 any	 generalized	 lists	 of	 safe	 countries.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	paragraph	(a)	speaks	about	agreements	on	return	to	one’s	own	country.	Yet,	the	terms	of	 paragraph	 (g)	 tend	 to	 point	 that	 the	 return	 to	 a	 third	 country	 is	 not	 excluded	 in	Objective	21.	Return	to	a	so-called	safe	third	country	poses	a	risk	of	chain	refoulement	and	 may	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 following	 a	 case-by-case	 assessment	 of	 safety	 of	 the	particular	country	for	the	particular	person.	In	terms	of	return	of	children,	regrettably,	paragraph	 (g)	 reflects	 the	 language	 of	 the	 EU	 Returns	 Directive	 and	 allows	 return	 of	children	 to	 broadly	 phrased	 “reception	 and	 care	 arrangement.”	 Objective	 21	 rightly	underscores	the	prohibition	of	collective	expulsion.	Indeed,	by	virtue	of	article	13	of	the	ICCPR,	 states	 are	 bound	 to	 assess	 the	 individual	 circumstances	 of	 every	 migrant	returned	 in	 a	 group.	 Monitoring,	 addressed	 in	 paragraph	 (f),	 is	 a	 crucial	 safeguard	against	ill-treatment	and	should	be	carried	out	during	removal	and	upon	arrival	to	the	destination	country.			Finally,	 the	 post-return	 reintegration	 phase	 is	 properly	 developed	 in	 Objective	 21.	 In	fact,	half	of	the	paragraphs	emphasize	sustainable	reintegration.	It	is	commendable	that	Objective	21	highlights	that	safety	upon	return,	economic	empowerment,	and	inclusion	are	necessary	 for	 sustainable	 reintegration	 and	 calls	 for	 provision	of	 legal,	 social,	 and	financial	support	to	returnees.	Likewise,	addressing	the	needs	of	communities	to	which	migrant	returns	is	very	welcome.	
Effective	Implementation	Follow	Up	and	Review	Professor	 Elspeth	 Guild,	 Queen	 Mary	 University	 of	 London,	 Stefanie	 Grant,	 London	School	of	Economics	and	Sandra	Lavenex,	University	of	Geneva		
Following	the	objectives,	the	Zero	Draft	turns	to	implementation	and	follow	up.	The	Zero	Draft	 acknowledges	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 the	 Compact	 will	 be	 a	 non-legally	 binding,	cooperative	 framework	which	 builds	 on	 the	Member	 States	 commitments	 in	 the	New	York	 Declaration.	 So	 within	 this	 framework	 of	 non-legally	 binding	 commitments,	 the	follow	 up	 is	 necessarily	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 undertaking	 of	 states	 to	 comply	with	their	 voluntarily	 given	 commitments.	 Still,	 the	 Draft	 uses	 the	 language	 of	 actionable	commitments	which	 indicates	 that	 the	UN	and	 its	Member	States	depend	on	all	 states	carrying	 out	 their	 duties	 as	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Compact.	 Highlighting	 capacity	 building	 is	useful	 from	 one	 perspective	 in	 that	 it	 is	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 importance	 of	implementation.	However,	capacity	building	must	not	be	an	excuse	to	criticize	countries	and	 regions	 for	 establishing	 free	 movement	 regions	 without	 border	 and	 passport	controls	 on	 movement	 of	 persons.	 Where	 countries	 and	 regions	 implement	 such	passport	 control	 free	 regimes	 this	must	 be	 accepted	 as	 compatible	with	 the	 Compact.	Pressure	 should	 not	 be	 placed	 on	 any	 state	 to	 harden	 its	 border	 controls	 on	 the	movement	 of	 persons	 merely	 because	 some	 other	 country,	 often	 not	 even	 sharing	 a	border	 with	 it,	 is	 reluctant	 to	 admit	 people	 entering	 or	 suspected	 of	 entering	 their	territory	from	that	country.	The	commitment	of	all	states	to	uphold	the	UDHR	and	the	ICCPR	 includes	 delivering	 the	 right	 of	 all	 persons	 to	 leave	 a	 state	 irrespective	 of	 the	nationality	of	the	person	leaving	or	whether	the	destination	state	has	agreed	a	priori	to	the	person’s	entry	there	(Article	12(2)	ICCPR).		The	Zero	Draft	also	recognizes	the	need	to	form	partnerships	with	civil	society,	migrants	and	 diaspora	 groups.	 This	 is	 very	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 consensus	within	society	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 migrants.	 Not	 infrequently	 some	 interior	 ministries	 become	distanced	from	the	day	to	day	realities	of	movement	of	persons	–	both	their	own	citizens	and	the	citizens	of	other	countries.	Civil	society	can	be	a	useful	partner	in	assessing	the	needs	and	priorities	of	migrants.			The	 Draft	 recognizes	 that	 the	 Compact	will	 provide	 substantial	 impetus	 to	 the	 UN	 to	engage	 with	 migration	 and	 calls	 for	 the	 investment	 of	 resources	 in	 the	 area.	 This	includes	strengthening	the	role	of	IOM	but	with	the	proviso	that	it	is	fully	within	the	UN	system,	 which	must	mean	 that	 IOM	 formally	 undertakes	 to	 respect	 UN	 human	 rights	standards	and	ensure	its	actions	are	fully	compliant.	Further,	the	Draft	calls	for	a	State-led	process	for	advancing	international	dialogue	on	migration	with	specific	reference	to	some	 existing	 UN	 institutions.	 Peer-to-peer	 assessment	 of	 implementation	 of	 UN	objectives	can	be	a	very	effective	way	to	encourage	compliance	with	States’	voluntarily	made	 commitments.	 The	 Human	 Rights	 Council’s	 Universal	 Periodic	 Review	 is	 an	excellent	example	of	how	valuable	such	peer-to-peer	approaches	can	be;	even	a	cursory	look	at	the	latest	review	of	countries	in	January	2018	reveals	that	the	issue	of	migration	and	state	compliance	with	human	rights	standards	in	respect	of	migration	is	a	recurring	theme.	 States	 pose	 probing	 questions	 to	 one	 another	 about	 compliance	 with	 human	rights	 standards	which	permit	 the	airing	of	 concerns,	 the	 reiteration	of	 standards	and	review	of	national	practices	in	a	positive	and	State-led	process.	Utilising	the	findings	of	the	 UPR	 to	 inform	 state-to-state	 review	 of	 migration	 commitments	 contained	 in	 the	Compact	 and	 human	 rights	 standards	might	 be	 useful;	 it	would	 also	 avoid	 the	 risk	 of	duplication	between	 the	Compact	and	 the	work	of	 the	Human	Rights	Council.	 It	might	include	adding	an	additional	reporting	function	to	the	mandate	of	some	Council	experts	–	 for	 example,	 the	Special	Rapporteurs	on	migrants,	 on	 the	 right	 to	health,	 to	 food,	 to	
education,	on	violence	against	women,	and	on	trafficking	-	to	enable	them	to	contribute	to	the	Compact’s	follow	up	and	review	process.		Further,	 regarding	 follow	 up	 and	 review,	 the	 Zero	 Draft	 proposes	 a	 road	 map	 of	institutions	and	deadlines	for	review	of	the	Compact.	This	is	most	welcome.	The	choice	of	 venue	 is	 one	 for	 the	 UN	 to	 determine,	 however	 it	 seems	 appropriate	 to	 develop	existing	venues	and	extend	their	capacities	and	responsibilities.	Also,	the	inclusion	of	a	place	 for	 regional	developments	 is	 very	 important.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 liberalisation	of	migration	 and	 border	 controls	 on	 the	 movement	 of	 persons	 seems	 to	 benefit	 from	regional	 agreement	 which	 may	 be	 more	 easily	 achieved	 than	 at	 the	 UN	 level.	 The	possibility	 of	 knitting	 together	 regional	 migration	 and	 border	 control	 free	 (or	 light)	regimes	is	tantalising	and	possibly	very	fruitful.	 In	this	respect	greater	coordination	of	existing	 regional	 institutions	 regulating	 free	 movement,	 border	 cooperation,	 but	 also	regional	 human	 rights	 and	 refugee	 protection	 frameworks	would	 be	welcome.	 As	 the	cases	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 of	 ECOWAS	 show,	 regional	 integration	 framework,	with	 their	 consolidated	 institutional	 base,	 broad	 mandate	 and	 genuine	 regional	ownership	 may	 provide	 fertile	 anchors	 for	 comprehensive	 regional	 migration	governance	 –	 more	 than	 the	 relatively	 loosely	 institutionalized,	 frequently	 externally	driven	Regional	Consultation	Processes	highlighted	in	the	final	section	of	the	Zero	Draft.		These	 comments	 are	 initial	 and	 do	 not	 cover	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 the	 Zero	 Draft.	 The	contributors,	in	their	personal	capacities,	have	provided	a	snapshot	of	their	preliminary	views.	We	welcome	the	debate	and	negotiation	of	 the	Compact	 in	 the	months	 to	come	and	remain	at	the	disposal	of	the	international	community	to	provide	more	analysis	and	comment.		14	February	2018		
